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AND SECURITIES REGULATION
RICHARD W. JENNINGS*
TiE silver anniversary of Mr. Justice Douglas's distinguished service on
the United States Supreme Court is a felicitous occasion for assessing his
impact on the law of corporation finance and securities regulation, particularly
here in the pages of the Yale Law Journal. It was at the Yale Law School
that the then Professor Douglas first gained recognition as a gifted teacher
and craftsman in the field of Corporation Law and Finance; and it was from
that base that he launched a meteoric career which led to his appointment to
a seat on our highest court in 1939 at the age of 40. Mr. Justice Douglas has
indeed brought honor to Yale as Yale now honors him.
This is a study of three periods in the life of the Justice. The first is that
of Professor Douglas, law teacher; it began shortly after his graduation from
the Columbia Law School in 1925 at the age of 26 and ended when he left
the faculty of the Yale Law School in 1934 to join the staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In terms of years his law teaching career was
brief; but we shall see that it was remarkably rich in intellectual achievement.
The second deals with his government service with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. Again his SEC career was amazingly short - a matter
of only five years. It began in October, 1934 when Douglas took leave from
his classes at the Yale Law School to become director of the Commission's
study of protective committees and reorganization practices under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. Under Douglas this investigation and study culminated in
a painstaking and devastating exposure of legal and corporate skullduggery
in reorganizations. In recognition of this contribution he was appointed to
membership on the Commission in January, 1936, to fill the vacancy created
by the resignation of Joseph P. Kennedy, who had served as the Commission's
first Chairman. Membership on the Commission gave him the opportunity
to participate more directly in the processes of securities regulation. He con-
tinued to head up the Protective Committee Study; but he also assumed di-
rection of the Commission's important Division of Trading and Exchanges,
the watchdog agency of the stock exchanges, whose operations up to that time
had not been greatly affected by regulation under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. This vantage point enabled him to make an intensive study of
the effectiveness of Exchange and SEC controls over trading. When in Sep-
tember, 1937, James M. Landis resigned as Chairman of the Commission and
Douglas was elected to that post by the Commission, he was ready with a
dynamic plan for the administrative control of finance. That program, carried
out under his leadership, ultimately led to sweeping legislative and adminis-
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trative reforms affecting corporate reorganizations, stock exchanges, and the
over-the-counter market. More importantly, it established the guidelines of
federal securities regulation which continue to this day. Basically, Douglas
advocated the principle of self-regulation by the securities industry under
strong SEC supervision; in certain areas, however, where fraud prevention
and disclosure were insufficient, he was insistent that the Commission should
undertake such direct regulation of the industry as the protection of investors
and the public interest demanded.
The third and continuing period spans Mr. Justice Douglas's quarter
century of service as a member of the Court. In view of the grave constitutional
issues which have occupied the attention of the Court during the greater part
of this period it is perhaps not surprising that problems of corporate and fi-
nancial law have tended somewhat to pale in significance. Nevertheless, in his
judicial role Mr. Justice Douglas, over the years, has continued to exert a
powerful influence in shaping the law in this area. No Supreme Court Justice,
not even Mr. Justice Brandeis, ever brought to the court such expertise and
deep understanding of the problems of corporate and financial law; none has
left such a personal imprint upon the law through opinions which now stand
as judicial landmarks in the unfolding law of corporate and securities regu-
lation.
I. IMPACT ON LEGAL EDUCATION
When William 0. Douglas graduated from the Columbia Law School in
1925, second in his class and an editor of the Columbia Law Review, he im-
mediately plunged into private practice with the crack Wall Street law firm
of Cravath, Henderson & De Gersdorf. This was no ordinary law firm. The
Cravath firm and the "Cravath system' 2 for training young lawyers was un-
surpassed for anyone who wanted an exposure in depth to the mysteries of
corporation law and finance. As Robert T. Swaine put it: "The firm's practice,
even in litigation, has dealt primarily with corporate and financial problems,
and the character of the work from year to year has teen increasingly deter-
mined by national economic conditions. Cycles of security issues in boom times
have been followed by cycles of receivership and reorganizations in times of
depression .... -3 Thus each period of boom and bust exposed a wide range of
problems arising during the life cycle of many corporations - from promotion
to insolvency and reorganization.
Douglas's tenure with the Cravath firm was short, lasting only fourteen
months.4 But this brief encounter with the dynamics of law practice must
1. A fascinating two-volume history of the Cravath firm has been written by SWAINE,
THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PRzDECESSORS-1819-1947 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
SWAINE].
2. For a description of the Cravath system and techniques of training associates, see
2 SWAiNE 1-12, 124-32 and passim.
3. 2 id. at 1.
4. 2 id. at xl. He was with the firm from Sept. 15, 1925-Jan. 28, 1926 and Oct. 1,
1926-June 30, 1927.
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have deepened his interest in the economic and social implications of the law
in action.
Although we do not know very much about the type of corporate problems
to which he was exposed we do know that he became involved in one of the
most fascinating bankruptcy reorganizations on record. For the Cravath firm
was deeply engrossed in the 1925-28 reorganization of the Chicago, Milwau-
kee & St. Paul Railway Co., one of the biggest receiverships in American
history and destined to become a cause c~lUbre on the abuses of receiverships.5
Paul D. Cravath, as counsel for Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the St. Paul bankers,
backed up by Swaine and "a corps of senior and junior associates," was master-
minding the reorganization. 6 Douglas was apprenticed to Swaine and became
a member of the "team." When a new corporation was organized in Delaware
to receive the properties of the debtor corporation upon the foreclosure sale,
he was one of the three Cravath associates who became its first directors
and officers.7
Along with what must have been a grueling schedule at Cravath, Douglas
started teaching separate courses on Bankruptcy and Partnership at the
Columbia Law School.8 A Columbia Law classmate, Carrol M. Shanks, who
was associated with the Wall Street firm of Root, Clark, Howland & Ballantine,
also started to teach a Seminar in Business Organizations at Columbia., To-
gether they plunged into a project looking ultimately toward a drastic reor-
ganization of law school materials on Business Units along functional lines.
This collaboration continued when Douglas joined the Yale Law Faculty
in 1928.10
Apparently Douglas and Shanks quickly reached the conclusion that law
school training in the corporate field was at least a generation behind the
5. For an economic and social history of the St. Paul receivership and reorganization,
see LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933). This receivership generated an investiga-
tion before the Interstate Commerce Commission, Committees of Congress and numerous
court proceedings. See Investigation of Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R., 131 I.C.C. 615 (1928) ;
Reorganization, 131 I.C.C. 673 (1928); Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York,
20 F.2d 808 (7th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 569 (1927) ; United States v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931). For an account of the St. Paul reorganization
through the eyes of Swaine, see 2 SwAmE 418-31, 546-47.
6. 2 SwAixE 419 n..2.
7. Swaine adds the delightful tidbit: "[John J.] McCloy was the president, and sev-
eral of the City papers published his picture-youthful, stern-visaged, with army pom-
padour and captain's uniform-as that of the youngest American railroad president." 2
SWAiNE 425 n.1.
8. AssociATIoN OF AMERICAN LAW ScHooLs, DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS IN MEMBER
ScHooLs 21 (1925) ; 23 (1926). Evidently the second semester of the 1925-26 year was
devoted fully to teaching and research. After another year of dividing his time between
teaching and practice Douglas turned his back on private practice for a law teaching
career.
9. AALS, DIRECToRY OF TEAcHEgS 67 (1925) ; id. at 72 (1926).
10. Mr. Shanks also joined the Yale Law Faculty, one year later. After one year at
Yale, Shanks returned to law practice but the collaboration continued until 1931-32 when
the two co-authored four casebooks on Business Units.
[Vol. 73 : 920
DOUGLAS AND CORPORATIONS
times. In most law schools, in the midtwenties, there were separate courses
in agency and partnership and only one course devoted to corporation law. In
the law school world, the corporation was portrayed as a rather uncomplicated
form of business unit. It had common stock; each share had one vote; and
cumulative voting was an aberration. The board of directors was selected and
elected by the shareholders exercising their electoral franchise and the board
always "managed" the corporation. The three most widely-used case books
devoted an excessive amount of attention to such philosophical questions as
the nature of corporate personality and the necessity of authority from the
state in order to incorporate." Beyond these questions, the hard core of the
course explored the traditional topics of corporate powers, the liability of a
corporation for the tortious and criminal activities of its representatives
(including the philosophical question whether vicarious liability should indeed
be imposed upon the entity), and the consequences of de facto and de jure
incorporation and of ultra vires action.1 2
In the real world, however, no such simple picture existed. To a great
extent the shareholders' rights had been altered by contractual provisions in
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. Under the "write-your-own-ticket"
statutes, corporate purpose clauses customarily were stated in such broad
terms as to permit the corporation to engage in almost any business under
the sun, thus rendering meaningless any talk of ultra vires. It was customary
to insert immunizing clauses in the certificate of incorporation in an effort
to do away with judge-made fiduciary rules regulating the dealings between
the corporation and its officers, directors and controlling shareholders. Pre-
ferred stock customarily carried no vote or had only a partial or contingent
right to vote; holders of bonds or debentures might or might not have a right
to vote.
When the holding company was sanctioned, control became further con-
centrated within the control group through use of partly or wholly-owned
subsidiary corporations and holding company pyramids. It also became possible
to achieve a further insulation from liability through the use of subsidiary
corporations and in many situations to avoid service of process on the parent.
Furthermore, outside of the corporate voting systems, the devices of the
voting trust and pooling agreements were available to concentrate control
within particular blocs so as further to distort the voting system. Or, actual
control of the corporation might take the form of a "shadow government" in
which the officers or directors were mere puppets who like the ventriloquist's
dummy appeared to speak for the corporation and the shareholders, but who
in fact echoed the wishes of some invisible puppeteer. Such arrangements
overrode the dogma prescribed in most corporation statutes that "the man-
11. See CANFIELD & WORMSER, CASES ON PRIVATE CoRPORATIoNS (2d ed. 1925);
RIcHARDs, CASES ON CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1924); WARREN, CASES (2d ed. 1916).
12. Cf. Ripley, Book Review, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 1220 (1931) ; RIPLEY, MAIN STREET
AND WALL STREET (3d ed. 1929); Isaacs, Book Review, 41 YALE L.J. 150 (1931).
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agement of the corporation shall be vested in a board of directors elected by
the shareholders." At best, the law school image gave a distorted picture of the
corporate system in operation; at worst, it tended to obscure the social and
economic role which the corporation had come to play in the American busi-
ness system and the need for social controls in the public interest. It had
long been clear to the corporate bar that law school courses in corporations
were far removed from reality.13 Evidently, Douglas and Shanks decided to
do something about it.
They did not march alone. Within the law school world, and particularly
at Yale and Columbia, the law school curriculum and methods of legal edu-
cation had come under sharp attack from a number of young Turks, with
support by some of their seniors.14 This unrest was soon to erupt into a de-
mand for legal "realism" in the study of law and legal institutions and for
greater experimentation with new approaches to legal education." Professor
Douglas was caught up in this ferment. The deficiencies of the conventional
methods of teaching Business Associations and the call for a new approach
was presented in a paper he read to the round table on Business Associations
at the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in De-
cember, 1928:
The focal point of study being the form of business unit ... [has resulted
in the] analysis [becoming so] conceptualized that the attention is too
frequently focused on the device used rather than on the function which
the device is intended to perform. Though courts and lawyers and students
have come closer than ever during the last twenty-five years to an ana-
lytical consideration of the social and economic forces working in and
through the guise of legal concepts and labels the continued use of
the old categories and classifications tends to confuse thought. . . . So
long as the quest is for the economic and social forces involved in the
cases it would seem that a set of categories which would focus attention
on such forces would be more desirable .... 16
13. Cf. Swaine, Book Review, 32 CoLUM. L. REV. 402 (1932).
14. At the Columbia Law School, one of the leaders of this revolt against the school
of analytical jurisprudence was Professor Underhill Moore. During his last hvo years in
law school Mr. Justice Douglas did work with Moore on the relation of law and business
and appears to have been greatly influenced by this association. Lerner, Wall Street's
New Mentor, 145 NATIoN 429, 430 (Oct. 23, 1937).
15. This is not the place to do more than, recall this controversy, which livened the
Law Reviews for a time. Dean Pound, representing what might be called the "Old Guard,"
mounted a vigorous attack upon the leaders of this movement, whom he described as the
"on-coming generation of American law teachers" and "our younger teachers of law."
Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. Rav. 697 (1931). Professor
K. N. Llewellyns reply makes a point by point rebuttal of Dean Pound's bill of par-
ticulars; it also includes a bibliography of writings of the "realists," which may be of
interest to later generations who may be unaware of this disputation. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realisn--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HIv. L. Rlv. 1222 (1931).
Professor Douglas by this time had gained a place on Llewellyn's honor roll of the "new
fermenters" in legal education.
16. The paper was later published: Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law of
Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REv. 673, 674-76 (1928).
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His proposal focused on "three basic processes concerned with the organi-
zation of business": 1. the assembly of resources; 2. "control" of the enterprise;
and 3. absorption of losses. The first concerned long-term financing through
bonds, stock or partnership contributions. The second would ascertain who
actually runs the business: "Titular management can be identified. But actual
control is more ephemeral. Such being the business phenomena it would
be more realistic to correlate the study of the law to the facts.' 7 The third
category would deal with the mechanisms involved in the performance of the
function of allocation of losses: "Who shall suffer most; who least? The man
giving his labor, the seller his coal, the stockholder his property, the bond-
holder his funds, have each contributed to the operation of the industrial
unit.... To what extent can each get out the value of that which he con-
tributes? These are problems in allocation of loss."' 8
In actual execution there was a considerable revision of these ideas. After
some experimentation at the Yale Law School four courses emerged. The
conventional courses of Agency, Partnership and Corporations were revamped
(with the inclusion of additional materials on finance and accounting) into
Business Units I (Losses), Business Units II (Management), Business
Units IIn (Finance) and Business Units IV (Reorganization). 19 And in
1931-32 Douglas and Shanks published four course books presenting their
ideas for a functional approach to Business Associations.
2 0
The book on losses, liabilities and assets represented primarily a change of
emphasis, rather than a change in content. There was, however, a comparative
treatment of the various forms of legal organization, resulting in a shift from
a stress on history to that of concentrating on current problems of law and
business. The book on management dealt with the various legal devices for
allocating control within the corporate structure. These included voting and
nonvoting shares, voting trusts, pooling agreements, restrictions on transfer
of shares, and the like. Another group of problems centered around the legal
strength of the various interest groups, as, for example, the right of a mi-
nority to prevent a dissolution or to compel the declaration of a dividend. The
remainder of the book dealt with formalities for exercising control, once the
allocation had been determined.2 1
17. Id. at 678.
13. Id. at 680.
19. See subjects listed as being taught by Professor Douglas in Assoc. OF At.
LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS FOR 1929 at 31; 1930 at 34; 1931 at 37.
20. DOUGLAS & SHANKS, CASES ON BUSINESS UNITS-LoSSEs, LIABILITIES, AND
ASSETS (1932) ; CASES ON BUSINESS UNITS-MANAGEMENT (1931) ; CASES ON BUSINESS
UNITS-FINANCE (1931); and CASES ON CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1931).
21. For an indictment of traditional texts and case books on corporations and an
enthusiastic endorsement by a Business School professor, see Isaacs, Book Review, 41
YALE L.J. 150 (1931) ("The book ... seems . . . to represent the first effective intro-
duction of... [the] modem aspects of corporation, law into the law school curriculum.").
Id. 150-51. And see O'Keeffe, Book Review, 5 So. CAL. L. REv. 176 (1931).
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
It was the books on finance and on reorganizations which made the greatest
break with tradition. The former introduced entirely new material grouped
around three aspects of the financing process: (1) the various types of securi-
ties and their provisions ;22 (2) the methods of acquiring assets ;2 and (3)
the marketing of securities..2 4 And for the first time a case book included a
generous number of corporate documents and forms illustrating the instru-
ments of finance then in current use, including a corporate mortgage and a
debenture as well as exemplary forms illustrating the various types of pre-
ferred and common stocks.25
The book on corporate reorganizations was the first in its field. It was con-
cerned with the process of refinancing corporations in financial stress through
the use of the equity receivership, or through voluntary procedures without
resort to court processes. In the main, emphasis was placed upon "the legal
problems incident to the preparation, promulgation, and consummation of
the reorganization plan and agreement." 26
The overall purpose of this new approach was to revitalize the study of
corporate law by broadening it to include related materials in the fields of
business and finance. This meant a shift away from "teaching teachers' law"
to "teaching lawyers' law. ' '27 Professor Douglas recognized that these case
books were only a beginning; that the material with which the financial lawyer
constantly deals "consists of statistics, banking practices, finance, accounting
principles and practices, problems of securities distribution, problems of
securities exchanges, problems of marketing, of prices, of labor, of production,
etc."'23 Aside from an occasional reference to Dewing,29 Veblen, 30 Brandeis,3 1
and Ripley,3 2 however, only a minimum amount of business materials as such
22. These included materials for the study of the corporate mortgage and debenture
and preferred and common stocks.
23. Among the nonconventional topics considered were those of acquisitions of busi-
nesses through the use of option agreements, sales of assets and merger and consolidation.
Attention was given to the antitrust and tax aspects as well as to rights of appraisal.
24. Here again such nonconventional areas as Blue Sky laws, selling circulars or
prospectuses, stock exchange listing and taxation were dealt with.
25. The book on finance was given an enthusiastic review by Mr. Elihu Root, Jr. in
41 YALE L.J. 481 (1932) and a rather cool reception in Payne, Book Review, 18 VA.
L. REv. 593 (1932).
26. The novelty of a case book on corporate reorganizations generated a number of
reviews commenting upon the usefulness of the book for corporate lawyers as well as for
teaching purposes. Of most interest to the writer were those of Dodd, 17 CORNELL L.Q.
317 (1932) ; Dewing, 45 HARv. L. Rsv. 11.38 (1932) ; Kline, 41 YALE L.J. 1255 (1932);
Peppin, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 347 (1932); and Swaine, 32 COLUm. L. Rnv. 402 (1932).
27. Douglas, Education for the Law, An, Address on law teaching in America before
the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business in April, 1936, printed in
DouGLAs, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 278 (Allen ed. 1940).
28. Id. at 287.
29. DEWING, FINANcIAL POLIcY OF CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1934).
30. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHn AND BusINESS ENTERPRISE (1923).
31. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (3d ed. 1932).
32. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (2d ed. 1927).
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was included. In this respect the materials were like an unfinished symphony;
there seems little doubt that Douglas envisaged a long range project looking
toward a full integration and fusion of business and legal materials for the
study of the corporation as a business institution. He referred to this uncom-
pleted task in 1936 when evaluating the existing deficiencies in American legal
education, particularly in the business field:
[We] are probably seeing only the bare beginning of an endeavor to
study the social and economic phenomena of our times.
. . . The impact of the corporate device on our social and economic
life is almost wholly neglected. The corporation as an object of control
and as a method of control is passed by. Even the nonconformists have
only started on the task of broadening the horizon in the corporate field.
The upshot . . . is not merely that adequate treatment of the law of
corporation finance calls for use of so-called business materials. The point
is that any considered treatment of this subject would entail a subtle
fusion of the so-called legal and business aspects since in final analysis
they are one. As a practical matter, viewed either from the legal or busi-
ness point of view, it would be difficult, except in terms of emphasis, to
differentiate between a law course and a business course on corporation
finance.33
But Professor Douglas did not conceive the law school mission as being
merely that of training more efficient corporate technicians. It was a matter
of producing socially enlightened lawyers.34 Although there are today far
richer materials in the fields of business and finance than existed in the twenties
and thirties, it must be confessed that legal education in most fields still fails
to measure up to these objectives. Through a broadened training in accounting,
finance and securities regulation and various seminars in business planning
we may indeed turn out better technicians. One wonders, however, whether
in our efforts to teach technical proficiency we also achieve the equally im-
portant objective of challenging our students to appraise the effectiveness of
our existing system of corporate regulation at the state and federal levels
and to weigh what steps might be taken to make the system more responsive
to community needs without hamstringing legitimate business. The recent
Report of the Special Study of the Securities Market 35 makes just such an
appraisal of the operation of our securities markets and the overall effectiveness
of the SEC legislation. Surely, if the law school is to fulfill its true role in
the education of the bar, the broader aims envisaged by Professor Douglas
must be made a dominant objective of legal education.
Quite apart from this successful effort to revitalize legal training in the
fields of law and finance, the half dozen years at the Yale Law School (1928-34)
were enormously productive in terms of legal research. This research, much
of which was done in collaboration with social scientists and other scholars in
33. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 27, at 281-84.
34. Id. at 286.
35. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURiTiES MARTS, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1903) [hereinafter cited as SEC SPECIAL STUDY].
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related fields, focused continuously on an attempt "to relate the legal problem
to its economic and social environment."
The end products which found their way into the lav reviews are astonish-
ing in both quality and quantity. They started off with the brillant study of
vicarious liability in terms of risk administration: liability should be imposed
vicariously upon that person who most nearly fills the role of the entrepreneur
in a given situation and thus possesses the ability to administer the risk through
manipulation of profit or cost differentals. 36 The increasing use of a parent-
subsidiary corporate structure evoked a somewhat similar analysis of the
methods of organization and operation of subsidiaries which should be regarded
as essential to secure parental insulation from liability for the subsidiary's
debts, again in terms of loss allocation. 7 The gap between ownership and
control in the modern corporation, arising from the diffusion of shares among
scattered shareholders accompanied by some shocking disclosures of manage-
ment derelictions, touched off a provocative article concerning "Directors Who
Do Not Direct." Several proposals were made for strengthening the position
of the shareholder vis-A-vis management within the corporate structure. Among
these was a suggestion for financing and developing a shareholders' protective
association, a nonprofit corporation to act as caretaker for shareholders' in-
terests. 8
At or just prior to the 1929 stock market debacle, Professor Douglas had
joined forces with the Yale Institute of Human Relations to conduct a study
of the antecedents of business failures in cooperation with the United States
Department of Commerce and Judge William Clark, sitting in bankruptcy in
the Federal Court for the District of New Jersey. This early experiment in
research in the behavioral sciences generated two articles exploring problems
and techniques in social science investigations 39 and others summarizing some
of the causes of business failures together with recommendations for improve-
ment of the bankruptcy act and its administration.4
0
36. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk: I & II, 38 YALE L.J.
584, 720 (1929). This is not to say that this effort to apply the "scientific method" to the
difficult problem of vicarious liability was entirely successful. Indeed, Professor Douglas
admitted that the "earmarks" of the entrepreneurial test (control, ownership, losses, and
profits) were helpful in the preliminary stages, but that in the final analysis the "prublem
would take on a sociological aspect" to be weighed in terms of risk prevention and risk
distribution. Id. at 597 n.35.
37. Douglas (with Shanks), Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Cor-
porations, 39 YALE LJ. 193 (1929). Cf. Anderson v. Abbott, infra note 282.
38. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1934).
39. Douglas (with Clark and Thomas), The Business Failures Project-A Problem
in Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930); Douglas (with Thomas), The Business
Failures Project-I. An Analysis of Methods of Investigation, 40 YALE L.J. 1034 (1931).
40. Douglas (with Marshall), A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and
Some Suggestions, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 25 (1932); Douglas, Some Functional Aspects
of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329 (1932); Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State
vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591 (1933). Professor Douglas also sponsored two
interesting studies by students in the Yale Law School as adjuncts of the bankruptcy
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As the drive for Federal securities regulation got underway, Professor
Douglas began to concentrate more and more on various problems of securi-
ties distribution. In 1932-33, he teamed up with Professor George E. Bates
of the Harvard Business School on a series of articles on various aspects of
securities regulation. Two of those surveyed a wide range of problems sur-
rounding the secondary distribution of securities by brokers and dealers; the
fiduciary relationship between broker and customer and dealer and customer;
an examination of various business arrangements in which the broker or
dealer acquires an interest adverse to his customer; and the legal duties flow-
ing from these relationships. 41
Messrs. Douglas and Bates were highly critical of the customary practice
in which a broker assumed the role of a security merchant in the purchase of
a security for a customer without disclosing that he was dealing for his
own account. The theory advocated, in contrast with some judicial decisions,
would impose a fiduciary duty upon the broker to disclose fully the capacity
in which he acted, the price paid for the security, and any commissions re-
ceived in connection with the purchase. The views thus urged were essentially
those later adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the in-
terpretation and administration of the general antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42
Upon the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 numerous problems of
statutory construction and of administration were widely discussed, the ques-
tion being raised whether the Act had not created so many uncertainties and
impediments for the business community as to be an unhealthy deterrent to a
lagging new issue market. Joining the dialogue, Douglas and Bates dissected
the Act, pointed up some of its deficiencies, ambiguities and uncertainties; and
recommended that the Act "be amended promptly not so as to change its
fundamental principles but in order to make it unambiguous, clear, and con-
sistent.143 Furthermore, it was recommended that administration of the Act,
then in the Federal Trade Commission, should be vested in an effective
specialized independent agency with a broader legislative base and with a
"more pervasive and flexible power" to deal with additional regulatory prob-
lems in the field of finance which the authors envisaged as in need of unique
treatment.
44
project: Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour
& Co., 42 YALE L.J. 526 (1933), and Nehemkis, The Boston Poor Debtor Court-A
Study in Collection Procedure, 42 YALE L.J. 561 (1933).
41. Douglas (with Bates), Secondary Distributions of Securities-Problems Sig-
gested by Kinney v. Glenny, 41 YALE L.J. 949 (1932); Douglas (with Bates), Stock
"Brokers" as Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46 (1933).
42. Arleen, W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 952 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1949) ; Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1316 (1948) ; 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1500-0 (2d ed.
1961).
43. Douglas (with Bates), The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,
211 (1933) ; Douglas (with Bates), Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment
Banking, 1 U. CH. L. Ray. 283 (1933).
44. Douglas (with Bates), supra note 43 at 43 YALE L.J. 171, 216-17 (1933).
19641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Shortly thereafter, however, Professor Douglas expressed his conviction
that the Securities Act standing alone would not be able to cope with the
difficult problem of protecting investors.4 r This view rested upon three propo-
sitions which seemed to him to be tolerably clear. First, the Securities Act
fell far short of accomplishing its purpose. Second, in any genuine program
for the permanent correction of the evils of high finance, the Securities Act
was of a secondary character. Third, vigorous enforcement of the Act would
spell its own defeat, for it was essentially antithetical to our whole economy.
It was, he believed, "a nineteenth-century piece of legislation ... [an attempt
to] 'turn back the clock' to simpler days."146 It assumes that American industry
is composed of little business units seeking funds and people who are "buying
shares with the modicum of intelligence with which they are supposed to buy
wearing apparel or horses.' 47 It assumes that the details of a large business
enterprise can readily be stated in a registration statement in a form that
persons lacking training or intelligence in financial matters can understand.
It imposes liability upon directors of all companies, large or small, whether
or not the directors can possibly make a reasonable investigation of the ac-
curacy of the registration statement. And in actual operation, though perhaps
the Act will prevent some fraudulent transactions which cannot stand the
light of publicity, essentially investors are still without any real protection.
Furthermore, the Act merely requires a disclosure at the time the security
is first marketed. The effect will soon be lost by the passage of time. There
is no machinery for making available to investors periodic reliable financial
data and other information concerning issuers. Nothing in the Act purports
to control the power of the self-perpetuating management group which domi-
nates most corporations. Nothing attempts to deal with the protection of the
rights of minorities; with the problem of capital structure, its soundness or un-
soundness; with mobilizing the flow of capital. Any really comprehensive
program for social control of finance must
... envisage a wide-range - from the increments of profit and control
(which are incident to the constitution and form of the organization) to
the terms and conditions of the organization, the kind and amount of
securities which may be issued, the terms on which they may be issued,
and the person to whom they may be sold. . . .The control needed is
one which would combine regulation by industry with supervision by
government.
48
If this form of regulation could be coupled with control of the stock exchanges
and "if more effective supervision over corporate organization and reorgani-
zation and over the relation of investors to the management were provided by
federal incorporation or otherwise, we should have laid such solid bases for
protection of investors as to make the .. . [Securities] act become wholly
45. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE R,.vIzw (n.s.) 521 (1934).
46. Id. at 529.
47. Ibid.
48. Id. at 530-32.
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insignificant." 49 In the following year, with the adoption of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Federal control of the securities markets moved in
this direction and subsequent SEC Acts became more pervasive in character,
though falling short of the degree of control which apparently Douglas foresaw.
The machinery developed for the reorganization of financially embarrassed
corporations was in critical need of overhaul in 1933. More than fifty railroads
owning in excess of twenty thousand miles of track were then in receivership;
other railroads had millions of outstanding debt securities with impending
maturities and a seeming lack of capacity to pay; and the market for new
issues for the purpose of refunding issues soon to become due was stagnant.50
Many industrial corporations were also in deep financial trouble. Over the
years the reorganization machinery had counted upon the availability of the
equity consent or "umbrella" receivership. 5 ' This institution, a construct of
ingenious lawyers, when stripped of all of its mythology, revealed a sordid
picture of champerty, conflicts of interest, abuse of process, and other violations
of professional ethics participated in by respectable members of the reorgani-
zation bar. In any realistic sense their conduct, though tolerated, was no less
antisocial than that of the "ambulance chaser" or the "striker."5 12 Aware that
federal court processes were being abused, the United States Supreme Court,
after a series of warnings,5 3 emphatically advised the reorganization bar that
the federal equity receivership was not a proper vehicle for effecting a cor-
porate reorganization, except in the case of "railroads and other public utilities
where continued operation of the property and preservation of its unity seemed
to be required in the public interest."5' 4
At the same time, however, the bankruptcy court was not an acceptable
forum for effecting a corporate reorganization. As early as 1916, Paul D.
49. Id. at 533.
50. See MOODY, RAIRoADs at a18 (1932), as supplemented by MOODY, MA~uA.
FOR STAm RAmRoADs 866 (1932) ; 46 ICC ANN. REP. 15-16 (1932) ; Swaine, Corporate
Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19 VA. L. REv. 317 (1933).
51. On the history and evolution of the equity consent receivership, see 2 SwA.NE
167-97; Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF COR-
roRTE FiNANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 153 (1917); Byrne, The Fore-
closure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, id. at 77, and Swaine, Re-
organization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade: I, 27 COLuJ.
L. REv. 901 (1927), id. II, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 29 (1928).
52. This is not to suggest that reorganization lawyers regarded customary reorgani-
zation practices as reprehensible. They regarded their conduct as fully justified, to protect
the interests of the security holders. For the best analyses of fact and fiction, see Foster,
Book Review, 43 YALEn LJ. 352, 355-56 (1933); LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS
131-45 (1933); ARoLD, THE FoLxiORn oF CAPrrALmsM ch. 10 (1937).
53. See Harldn v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 52 (1928) ; Michigan v. Michigan Trust
Co., 286 U.S. 334, 345 (1932).
54. First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504, 515 (1934). And see Shapiro v. Wil-
gus, 287 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1932). For a more sympathetic and nostalgic view of the
equity consent receivership by one who was piqued by the Supreme Court's hostility, see
Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 HAnv. L. REV. 39,
41-45 (1934).
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Cravath had noted the "impatience of the bankruptcy court to secure an early
sale and distribution" 5 whereas the equity receivership might permit the
debtor to continue in possession of the properties while sitting "under the
protection of the Chancellor's umbrella," thereby staving off creditors while
hoping to ride out the financial storm. Furthermore, doubts were expressed
as to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to pass on the fairness of any
reorganization. In the absence of any such power, Northern Pacific Ry. v.
Boyd 51 was thought to stand for the proposition that the purchasing corpora-
tion must, as a part of the plan of reorganization and sale of the properties,
make a "fair offer" to an undetermined number of claimants, if the shareholders
retained an interest in the corporation over and above any fresh money con-
tributed by them to the new enterprise.5 7 The deepening financial crisis and
the need for new reorganization processes impelled the Congress in 1933 and
1934 to amend the Bankruptcy Act to regulate reorganizations of railroad
companies and other general business corporations.58
In the midst of this ferment and as a part of his broad examination of bank-
ruptcy problems, Professor Douglas explored some of these pressing prob-
lems. There were, for example, large chain store organizations, which, as
lessees, had become committed on long-term leases calling for the payment
of fixed rents on store locations only later to face declining sales and inventory
losses arising from depressed prices. These tenants began to turn to bankruptcy
(or receivership) as a means of avoiding leases and cutting overhead. In an
article, written with Jerome (later Judge) Frank, then a research associate
in the Yale Law School, Professor Douglas took a long look at the landlord's
claim in bankruptcy or in equity receivership, from the standpoint of prova-
bility of the claim and as respects the application of the Boyd case. 0 The
Boyd case was thought to open the way for the landlord to participate in the
reorganization on an equitable basis even though at the time of the reorgani-
zation sale his claim was wholly contingent.60
The pages of the Harvard Law Review were used in February, 1934, to
take a close look at the utility of protective committees in railroad reorganiza-
55. Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF COR-
PORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 153, 161 (1917).
56. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
57. See Friendly, supra note 54, at 47-48.
58. The Railroad Reorganization Act, 47 Stat. 1467, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205 (1953) added
§ 77 to the Bankruptcy Act. This was followed in 1934 by the so-called Corporate Re-
organizations Act, 48 Stat. 911 (1934), which added § 77A and § 77B. Section 77A con-
ferred upon the courts of bankruptcy jurisdiction over corporate reorganizations of rail-
road corporations, except those subject to the provisions of § 77, and also any other cor-
poration which could become bankrupt. For general comment, see Dodd, Reorganization
Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48 HAxv. L. REv. 1100 (1935); Friendly,
supra note 54; Weiner, Corporate Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,
34 COLUm. L. Rav. 1173 (1934).
59. See note 56 supra.
60. Douglas & Frank, Landlords" Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003
(1933).
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tions in view of the enactment of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.6 1 This
article sought to answer specific criticisms of the "constitution, functions, and
control of protective committees" which had recently been made by Max
Lowenthal. 2 It was Mr. Lowenthal's thesis that the system and new legis-
lation were defective because: (1) the methods for constituting protective
committees and the broad terms of the deposit agreement effectively deprived
the security holders of any voice in formulating the plan of reorganization;
(2) the security holders' ratification of the plan of reorganization was thus
wholly fictitious; (3) adequate protection of the small investors should not
depend upon the representation of large institutional investors who are too
closely tied to the banking and speculative equity groups; (4) protective com-
mittee racketeering was not only still possible, but even probable under the
new legislation; (5) fees and expenses remained largely uncontrolled; and
(6) committee members and their associates were not specifically prohibited
from trading in the deposited securities and were thus in a position to profit
from the use of inside information, not generally available to security holders.
Professor Douglas conceded the need for reform and regulation of pro-
tective committees but rejected the solutions proposed by Mr. Lowenthal.
In general, he thought that there was "great utility and virtue in having inde-
pendent, well organized, aggressive, powerful protective committees"; that
the bargain in reorganization could not be struck by the use of a town meeting;
that the committee had to be delegated broad powers to act when it went into
the bargaining sessions with other creditors; and that the solution lay in
perfecting the machinery for the selection of committees and in minimizing
in various ways the possibilities of abuse. Indeed, most of the abuses had
arisen in the past "because so often the committees [had] ... been constituted
by the inside groups . . . drawn from the old management or the financial
interests associated with it. . . ." or were composed of "speculative equity
groups." 03 The solution lay in applying the principles of representative de-
mocracy to the selection process: (1) election machinery should be provided
to enable private interests to "select their own representatives to serve their
cause" ;6 (2) the selection process "would entail full disclosure of the various
interests and affiliations of those being elected";65 (3) the committees so
constituted should have "a broad grant of powers so that they would have
real authority necessary to serve investors effectively" ;66 (4) the Interstate
Commerce Commission should be given the power "to adjudicate differences
between depositors and committees as to certain matters, such as expenses.167
61. Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 HAv. L. Rv.
565 (1934).
62. LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933); Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorgani-
zatioit Act, 47 HARv. L. REv. 18 (1933).
63. Douglas, supra note 61, at 566-67.
64. Id. at 587.
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 588.
67. Ibid.
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A few months later Congress, in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, "authorized and directed" the Securities and Exchange Commission
"to make a study and investigation of the work, activities, personnel and func-
tions of protective and reorganization committees ... to report the result of
its studies and investigations and its recommendations to the Congress" by
January, 1936.68 It is probable that it was the Harvard Law Review article on
protective committees "which took the eye of [Chairman Joseph P.] Kennedy
and [Commissioner James M.] Landis.. ." .and which led to the appointment
of Professor Douglas as the Director of the SEC Protective Committee Study
in 1934.69 With this event his relatively brief but astoundingly successful
career as professor of law came to an end and the five years of government
service began. According to Time, "When Bob Hutchins became president of
University of Chicago, [in 1929] he dubbed Douglas 'the outstanding pro-
fessor of law of the nation,' offered him $20,000 to go to Chicago."70 Nothing
in Professor Douglas' record of achievement at Yale suggests that President
Hutchins was exaggerating.
II. TiE SEC YEARS
The Douglas record at the Securities and Exchange Commission was well
publicized at the time.71 His more notable public addresses and statements,
sketching his philosophy of corporate and securities regulation, have been
collected and published in the well-known book, Democracy and Finance.7 2 The
book's timely appearance, shortly after his appointment to the highest court,
has made it of continuing interest not only to students of corporation finance
but to all who have sought insights into the Justice's attitude both to the
government of business and to the business of government. On the more
technical side there is the now classic Protective Committee Stud y 7 which
he prepared with the assistance of an extraordinarily capable staff. This study
laid the foundation for essential legislative reforms: the Chandler Act which
added Chapter X to the Bankruptcy Act 74 and the Trust Indenture Act of
1939.7 5 Other securities legislation is directly traceable to his brilliant leader-
ship on the Commission. Perhaps the most noteworthy is the Maloney Act 76
68. Securities Act of 1933, § 28 added by Title II, of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 48 Stat. 909 (1934).
69. Time, Oct. 11, 1937, p. 64.
70. Ibid.
71. Among the best character studies are Rodell, Douglas Over the Stock Exchange,
Fortune, Feb. 1938, p. 64; Lerner, Wall Street's New Mentor, Nation, Oct. 23, 1937,
p. 429; and Creel, Young Mat; Went East, Collier's, May 9, 1936.
72. DOUGLAS, DmsocacY AND Fn.ANcE (1940 ed.), with an introduction and notes,
by James Allen of the SEC staff.
73. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION Or THE WoRK, AcTIvEs,
PERsoNxEL. AND FuNcTIoNs OF PRoTE CTvE ANm REORGANIZATION CoMmT TTEs (1936-40)
[hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT].
74. Sections 101-276, 52 Stat. 840, 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958).
75. 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1958).
76. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), adding § 15A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 780-83 (1958).
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which furnishes the legislative base for the National Association of Securities
Dealers. The investment company study and legislation was in the works
and well along when Douglas left the Commission for the Court. All of this
legislation stands as an enduring monument to the Douglas era of the SEC.
Looking backward after a quarter century at his accomplishments while
with the Commission, the most notable contributions seem to me to lie in
three directions: (a) the effort to overhaul corporate reorganization practices;
(b) the battle for stock exchange reforms; and (c) the extension of the prin-
ciple of self-regulation to the over-the-counter markets through the mechanism
of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
A. The Experiment in Reorganization Reform
Reference has already been made to the grimy state into which reorganiza-
tion practices had fallen in the pre-depression period.7 7 When the great de-
pression swept across the country, bringing with it an enormous increase in
the number of financially distressed concerns, the reorganization machinery
came more and more into the limelight; and the story of its abuse became a
matter of common knowledge and concern. Concurrently with the adoption
of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act in 1934, Congress directed the Securities
and Exchange Commission to undertake a study of creditors' and stockholders'
protective committees in reorganizations.78 The aim of the protective com-
mittee study was to investigate reorganization practices, expose them to public
view, and make recommendations to the Congress. The report was presented
to Congress during the period April 30, 1936 to September 30, 1940, in
eight parts.79
By 1937, the Commission had completed those parts of the report most
directly concerned with reorganization procedures. The report delved into
reorganization practices in far greater depth than any previous study or in-
vestigation; nevertheless, as one knowledgeable commentator observed: "The
factual portions of the Report disclose little that students of reorganization
have not generally known, and reorganizers taken for granted."80
The Study found that too often reorganizations were masterminded from
behind the scenes by reorganization managers allied with the corporation's
management or its bankers.8 ' Control was cemented by shopping for a "friend-
77. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909 (1934), amending the
Securities Act of 1933.
79. For critiques of the Report, see Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Conzmss-
sion's Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganization, 38 CoLum. L. REv. 223 (1938);
Swaine, "Democratization!' of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUm. L. REv. 256 (1938) ;
Weiner, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganization, 38
CoLUM. L. Rsv. 280 (1938) ; Laporte, Changes in Corporate Reorganization Procedure
Proposed by the Chandler and Lea Bills, 51 H.ARv. L. Rv. 672 (1938).
80. Weiner, supra note 79, at 280.
81. The Study found that in 67% of the cases arising under § 77B in 1936, the
property had been remitted to the custody of the debtor. SEC REPORT, pt. II, at 523 n.4.
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ly" judge willing to leave the debtor in possession and to appoint "friendly"
trustees.8 2 This brotherly approach was likely also to permit the inside group
to ward off investigations of fraud, mismanagement or other irregularities
which may have contributed to the debacle.83 Armed with this advantage
and a private list of creditors and shareholders, consents were solicited under
deposit agreements which forestalled the organization of an effective oppo-
sition, 4 permitted the insiders to trade in the securities on the basis of inside
information, 5 and gave to the managers untrammeled power to fix the ex-
penses of reorganization, including attorneys' fees, free of judicial supervision.80
With a plan of reorganization prepared in advance by the lawyers for the Com-
mittee and the necessary consents in hand, courts generally could be prevailed
upon to confirm the plan against attacks of unfairness on the theory that the
creditors and shareholders had freely consented and were in the best position
to protect their own interests.8 7 The whole affair thus became a "lawless"
operation masquerading under a facade of legitimacy. The larger question
was whether the machinery of government was capable of making any lasting
and effective reforms in this traditionally chaotic field.
The Commission recommendations for reform fell into three broad cate-
gories :88 (a) alteration of the reorganization provisions of section 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act; (b) providing additional investor protection for holders
of debt securities issued under Trust indentures; and (c) direct regulation of
the structure and activities of protective committees in reorganizations. These
proposals were incorporated into three bills: the Chandler Acts9 to add
Chapter X to the Bankruptcy Act, the Barkley Bill 9 containing the Trust
Indenture Act and the Lea Bill,91 the so-called Protective Committee Act.
The revisions of reorganization procedure, with some modifications, ulti-
mately were adopted as Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, superseding Section
For the techniques used by inside groups to capture and maintain control over the pro-
ceedings, see SEC REPORT, pt. I, at 243-670.
82. SEC RFPORT, pt. I, at 243-312.
83. Various case histories were reported to substantiate the proposition that claims
against prior management will not be vigorously pursued if the receivers and trustees,
and the protective committees, are dominated by management and allied interests. SEC
RFoRT, pt. II, at 32-163, 187-200, 250-94.
84. SEC REPORT, pt. I, at 408-670.
85. SEC REPORT, pt. II, at 315-51. Fifty-seven per cent of all deposit agreements
reviewed by the Commission expressly permitted trading in the securities represented by
the committees on which the insider served; only 4 out of 846 agreements expressly
prohibited or restricted such trading. Id. at 319.
86. SEC REPORT, pt. II, at 351-94.
87. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1937) ; DOUGLAs, D mocRACY AND
FIxANcE 189 (Allen ed. 1940).
88. For the Commission's conclusions and recommendations see SEC REroRT, pt.
VIII at 308-43.
89. H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
90. S. 2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
91. H.R. 6968, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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77B. 92 The new requirement of a qualified, independent and disinterested
trustee (except in certain cases involving small companies) 93 helped to re-
store the integrity of the reorganization process, and to break the grip which
reorganization managers and bankers had previously held over the rehabili-
tation of insolvent companies. 94 The trustee is granted broad responsibilities
in effecting the reorganization of the enterprise. Thus, if the court approves,
he may investigate the condition of the company and the causes of failure,
ferret out fraud or mismanagement giving rise to corporate claims, and dismiss
the management or retain them to operate the business under his supervision.95
He is further charged with the duty of formulating a plan of reorganization,
after consultation with creditors and shareholders. 96
For the expertise formerly furnished by reorganization managers who often
were identified with the debtor, or its bankers, the SEC is substituted. The
court may submit to the Commission any plan which it regards as worthy of
consideration for its examination and report and must do so in those cases
where the scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000. 97 Although the Com-
mission's report is purely advisory, the Commission is in a position to play
a crucial and aggressive role in the reorganization process. 98
After formulaton of the plan by the trustee and the submission by the
SEC of its advisory report, the Court must tentatively approve the plan be-
fore its submission to creditors and shareholders.99 Every effort is made to
92. 52 Stat. 840, 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958).
93. Section 156, 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1958). In the view of Com-
missioner Douglas ". . . the independent trustee is the real key to reform. In comparison,
the other reforms are secondary." Hearings on H.R. 6439, supra note 92, at 177. The
same standards of independence required of trustees are also made applicable to counsel
to the trustee. Section 157, 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 557 (1958). A "disinterested"
person is defined in § 158, 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1958).
94. Control by these groups hinged upon the possibility of appointing "friendly"
trustees and of leaving the debtor in possession. Section 128, 52 Stat. 886 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 528 (1958), rendered forum shopping virtually impossible by confining juris-
diction to the district where the principal place of business or principal assets are located
rather than in the state of the debtor's incorporation.
95. Section 167, 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567(1) (1958). On the importance
of an opportunity for a thorough appraisal of management on the occasion of a reor-
ganization, see DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FiNANCE 188-91 (Allen ed. 1940).
96. Sections 167(b), 169, 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 567(b), 569 (1958).
97. Section 172, 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1958). The SEC must be
given notice of all steps taken in connection with the proceedings. 52 Stat. 903 (1938),
as amended, 66 Stat. 431 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 665 (1958). It may file an appearance in
any such proceeding upon approval of the judge and thus attain the status of an inter-
ested party, with the right to be heard on all matters. But it is expressly denied the right
of appeal. Section 208, 52 Stat. 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1958).
98. See DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FiNAN cE 191-92 (Allen ed. 1940).
99. Section 174, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1958). Inside groups are thus
forestalled from attempting to gain control of the reorganization by using prior consents
to corral creditors and shareholders. Indeed, unless the court permits prior solicitations,
creditor consents accepted before such submission, even though merely provisional, are
invalid. Section 176, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1958).
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protect outside creditors and shareholders by making the court's approval
conditional upon a finding that the plan is "fair and equitable, and feasible."'1'0
Final confirmation is further contingent upon approval by two-thirds in amount
of the creditors of each class, and, if the debtor is not found insolvent, by the
shareholders holding a majority of each class of stock.1 0'
Fees and expenses are subject to judicial control.10 2 Although monetary
recognition is to be given to all those who contribute constructively to the
reorganization, overall compensation for fees is thus to be kept within reason-
able bounds. 0 3 Various devices are introduced to discourage obstructionists 104
or the intervention of purely speculative interests. 05 Inside groups no longer
are to be allowed to have a monopoly on private lists of bondholders.0 0
The Protective Committee Study's recommendations concerning corporate
indentures and trustees ultimately triggered the Trust Indenture Act of
1939.107 This statute subjects trustees under trust indentures to disqualifica-
100. Section 174, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1958). It was thought that
with the administrative and expert financial assistance of the SEC the courts would be in
a position to play a vital and affirmative role in reorganization. DOUGLAs, DEMOCRACY
AND FINANcE 194-96 (Allen ed. 1940).
101. Section 179, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1958).
102. Prior to the enactment of Chapter X, fees of committees and their counsel were
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, if made the subject of private agreement. This
proposition was established in the famous St. Paul reorganization, where the Supreme
Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission lacked jurisdiction to control the
fees of the protective committees and their counsel which had been fixed by an agree-
ment between the committees and security holders to which the debtor railroad was not
a party. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931).
103. Sections 241-50, 52 Stat. 900 (1938), 11 U.S.C. f§ 641-50 (1950). No compen-
sation is to be allowed to "any committee or attorney, or other person acting in the pro-
ceedings in, a representative or fiduciary capacity. . . ." who after assuming this role
purchases or sells the debtor's claims or stock, directly or indirectly, without approval of
the court. Section 249, 52 Stat. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1958).
104. Attorneys for creditors and stockholders who appear on any matter must file a
statement containing the names and addresses of those whom they represent. Section 210,
52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 610 (1958).
105. Every person or committee, representing twelve or more creditors or stock-
holders, and every indenture trustee must furnish the court a written statement, under
oath, which includes (1) a copy of the instrument under which they are acting; (2) the
facts in connection with their selection; (3) the amounts of claims or stock owned;
(4) the dates of acquisition, prices paid and amounts thereafter sold; and (5) a state-
ment that such claims or stock were acquired at least a year before the filing of the
petition. Section 211, 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 611 (1958).
106. The court may now order any person having a list of security holders to turn
this information over to the trustee if it regards this information as necessary for the
preparation of the list of creditors. Section 165, 52 Stat. 889 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 565
(1958).
107. 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1958). For vigorous criticism of the
Commission's Report on indenture trustees, see McCollom, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Trustees, 36 CoLum. L. REv. 1197 (1936); Wham, Trustees
Under Indentures, 23 A.B.A.J. 179 (1937). For more favorable comment, see Posner,
The Trustee and the Trust Indenture: A Further Study, 46 YALm L.J. 737 (1937);
Comment, Protection for Debenture Holders, 46 Y.AI. L.J. 97 (1936).
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tion, if they acquire conflicts of interest not compatible with their fiduciary
obligations. 08 The objective of this legislation is to transform the trustee
from the passive position which he customarily assumed prior to the adoption
of the Act to that of an active trustee with affirmative fiduciary obligations
to the holders of the indenture securities. 109
Recommendations were also made for the reform of protective committees." 0
Strangely enough, however, nothing tangible came of these proposals inasmuch
as the Lea Bill,"' following hearings,'1 2 expired in the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
Although it was the purpose of Chapter X to give reorganization procedures
a good scrubbing, the experiment so far has not been overly successful. Cor-
porate debtors increasingly find it possible to avoid the pervasive regulation
of Chapter X by the use of the arrangement procedure prescribed in Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter XI was enacted at the time of the passage
of Chapter X, presumably for the purpose of providing a more simplified pro-
cedure for adjusting unsecured creditors' claims against small distressed
companies. 1 3 Whereas Chapter X, as developed by the Protective Committee
proposals, surrounds the reorganization process with an elaborate system of
safeguards for the protection of creditors, Chapter XI permits the perpetua-
tion of the old reorganization system, with statutory sanction. In effect, the
arrangement procedure provided in Chapter XI is merely an adaptation of
the informal composition process, previously authorized by section 12 and
74 of the Bankruptcy Act, with its accent on the spirit of "friendly compro-
mise." Nevertheless, Chapter XI eliminated two of the fatal defects of the
informal, extra-judicial procedures to be found in such compositions: the
threat of involuntary bankruptcy and the absence of power to compel recalci-
trant creditors to accept an arrangement which would postpone liquidation for
the purpose of allowing the business to continue in the hopes of riding out
the financial storm.114 Chapter XI was the product of a successful campaign
108. Section 310(b), 53 Stat. 1158 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b) (1958). Exculpatory
clauses seeking to immunize the trustee from the normal obligations of a fiduciary are
prohibited. Minimum standards are now prescribed for indentures as a condition to
qualification under the Act. Section 315, 53 Stat. 1171 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (1958).
109. For the background and an analysis of the Barkley Bill see Banks, Indenture
Securities and the Barkley Bill, 48 YAr.E L.J. 533 (1939). On the Trust Indenture Act,
see 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 720-53 (1961).
110. SEC REPORT, pt. VIII at 308-36.
111. H.R. 6968, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). For a critique of the Lea Bill see the
articles cited in note 79 supra.
112. Hearings on H.R. 6968 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
113. See DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 174 (Allen ed. 1940); Rostow & Cut-
ler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1337 (1939).
114. Rostow & Cutler, sipra note 113, at 1337. Under Chapter XI, however, only the
rights of the unsecured creditor may be adjusted and this must be accomplished without
tampering with the status of any other class of securityholders.
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waged by the National Association of Credit Men and the National Bankruptcy
Conference, the latter being comprised of a self-appointed group of bank-
ruptcy lawyers and other persons who are in the inner circle of the bankruptcy
establishment. These groups were interested in establishing a speedy, econom-
ical and informal judicial machinery for dealing with insolvent debts, with
none of the nonsense surrounding Chapter X. They were also interested in
preserving the lucrative stakes in various facets of bankruptcy practice. 11
Chapter XI is the antithesis of Chapter X. The absence of safeguards com-
parable to those found in Chapter X was described by Mr. justice Stone in
SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co. in this way:
Every phase of the procedure bearing on the administration of the estate
and the development of the arrangement is under the control of the debtor.
The process of formulating an arrangement and the solicitation of consent
of creditors, sacrifices to speed and economy every safeguard, in the
interest of thoroughness and disinterestedness, provided in Chapter X.
The debtor is generally permitted to stay in possession and operate the
business under the supervision of the Court, section 342, and a trustee is
provided for only in the case where a trustee in bankruptcy has previously
been appointed and is in possession, or if "necessary" a receiver may be
appointed. Section 332. The debtor proposes the arrangement, sections
306(1), 323, 357, and the only opportunity afforded the creditors in respect
to the proposed plan is to accept or reject it as submitted by the debtor.
Acceptances may be solicited either before or after filing the petition and
always before approval of the plan by the Court, section 336(4). Section
361 authorizes confirmation of an arrangement when accepted by all
the creditors affected by it, "if the court is satisfied that the arrangement
and the acceptance are in good faith," and section 362 permits confirma-
tion if only a majority of the creditors affected accept.116
Added to this is the absence of provision for investigations of the debtor's
affairs by an independent trustee of the court. Furthermore, creditors' com-
mittees are permitted but there is no control over their selection and conduct
such as that found in Chapter X. 117 The arrangement may be formulated by
the debtor and the leading creditors and approval at a meeting of creditors
may be mere ceremony. The Court, in passing on the arrangement, lacks the
independent advice of a trustee or the SEC as required in Chapter X and
generally its approval becomes perfunctory in the face of the fact that a ma-
jority of creditors have already approved the plan.
The threat to Chapter X stemming from the existence of these two systems
of reorganization was pointed out in the classic article by Rostow and Cutler
in the pages of this Journal, shortly after the enactment of the legislation.' 18
Over the years, Chapter X has more and more faded into the background as
bankruptcy lawyers have learned how to stage a Chapter XI proceeding so
115. Ibid. See SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 450
n.8 (1940).
116. 310 U.S. 434, 450-51 (1940). Cf. Rostow & Cutler, supra note 113, at 1344.
117. Sections 334, 338, 52 Stat. 908 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 734, 738 (1958).
118. Rostow & Cutler, supra note 113.
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as to keep it out of Chapter X. In General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky 119 Mr.
Justice Douglas, as a member of the Supreme Court, attempted to delineate
the respective jurisdiction of Chapter X and Chapter XI. Further considera-
tion of this problem will therefore be postponed until that case is considered. 20
B. Stock Exchange Reform
From the moment he became SEC Commissioner in January, 1936, Douglas
began to concentrate upon the operation of the securities markets and par-
ticularly the New York Stock Exchange. While continuing to direct the Pro-
tective Committee Study, he also became the Commissioner responsible for
the important Division of Trading and Exchanges, the unit that monitors
the stock exchanges. 1 21
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 122 had given the Commission vast
powers over the exchanges. Thus, if the public interest and the protection
of investors demanded, it could investigate stock exchange practices and make,
impose and enforce trading rules. 23 Section 11 gave the power to regulate
or prevent floor trading by members for their own or for discretionary accounts.
Specialists and odd-lot dealers were also subject to regulation. In addition,
Congress had directed the Commission to study the feasibility and advisability
of the complete segregation of the functions of dealer and broker and report
to it the results of its study and recommendations.
The New York Stock Exchange traditionally had opposed any change in
the existing system, which permitted one person to combine these functions,
thus enabling him to act as an agent and fiduciary for others without foregoing
the right to trade for his own account. The system inevitably created a con-
flict of interest between the broker-dealer and his customer, when both dealt
in the same stock. It also gave material advantages to the floor member as
compared to public customers, by virtue of his presence on the floor and the
lower trading costs arising from exchange membership. 124
Despite the broad powers conferred by the 1934 Act, the Commission had
backed away from adopting trading rules, except those forbidding pools and
market manipulation. During the Chairmanship of Joseph P. Kennedy, how-
ever, it had prodded the New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges to
adopt the so-called Kennedy trading rules.1 25 These rules, among other things,
119. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
120. See notes 223-25 infra and accompanying text.
121. Rodell, supra note 71, at 116-20.
122. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1958).
123. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 11, 19, 48 Stat. 891, 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78k, 78s (1958).
124. See SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE
SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 14-21 (1936); DOUGLAS,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 96 (Allen ed. 1940).
125. After a comprehensive survey of the activities of specialists, floor traders, and
odd-lot dealers on the New York Stock Exchange and other exchanges, the Commission
formulated "suggested" rules for the regulation of trading. These rules were sent to the
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sought to make it difficult to sell short on a falling market by forbidding short
sales below the last reported sale. The specialist system, whereby a floor mem-
ber who is registered as a specialist in one or more stocks is allowed to act
as broker for the account of other members and their customers, as well as
deal in such stock or stocks for his own account, was continued; however, a
specialist combining the two functions could trade for his own account only
where reasonably necessary in order to permit him "to maintain a fair and
orderly market." The interpretation of these rules frequently entailed the
application of subjective standards, and the exchanges had shown little in-
clination to use disciplinary measures against members caught breaking the
rules. This attitude in part stemmed from the fact that infractions of the rules
were regarded as a purely private affair of no concern to the public. More-
over, the governing board of the New York Stock Exchange was dominated
by the specialist and floor-trader groups, whereas commission brokers who
deal directly with the public had little effective representation. 126
With matters in this posture, the Commission, in June, 1936, sent its report
on the feasibility and advisability of segregating the functions of dealer and
broker to Congress. 12 7 Although the report was "preliminary in character"
it did look eventually toward a "functional segregation of all members on
the floor of the exchange with the exception of the specialist in the stocks in
which he specializes.' 128 This requirement would prevent floor traders from
acting as brokers; and floor brokers and commission brokers could not, while
on the floor of the exchange, initiate orders for their own account or for the
account of their firms. Other proposals were made for control of floor trading,
for restrictions on the activities of specialists, and for trading by members in
stocks off the floor of the exchange. 129
Whether or not triggered by the segregation study, shortly after the pub-
lication of this report Mr. Charles R. Gay, President of the New York Stock
Exchange, spoke out in favor of continuing to allow stock market speculation
by professional traders as indispensable to the maintenance of market liquidity.
exchanges with the Commission's request that they be adopted. Most exchanges adopted
the rules as recommended or with modifications. 1 SEC ANN. REP. 13-14 (1935). The
rules may be found in id. at 40-44.
126. In a report to Congress in January, 1935, the Commission had made a number
of recommendations for changing the rules of the exchanges in order to give a better
balance in exchange government to commission firms, thus insuring fairer representation
of the membership and better enforcement of disciplinary rules. H.R. Doc. No. 85, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935). The proposal was directed primarily at the New York Stock
Exchange; it contemplated "voluntary" action by the exchanges rather than direct legis-
lation. See SEC REPORT, SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuiuris MARxETS OF THE SECURTIES
AND EXCHANGE CommIssION, pt. 4 at 506 (1963). [Hereinafter cited as SEC SPECIAL
STUDY.]
127. SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADvisABILiTY OF THE COMPLETE SEGRE-
GATION OF THE FuNc'riozs OF DEALER Am BROKR (1936).
128. Id. at iii. See DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 96-97 (Allen ed. 1940).
129. See note 127 supra.
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It was his opinion that the margin restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve
Board (which were then set at forty-five per cent of current value as compared
with the current seventy per cent limitation) together wih SEC regulation
had contributed to make the markets so thin that relatively small increases
in the volume of transactions tended to cause undue fluctuations in prices. The
market break of 1936 was thought to illustrate the point.130
Commissioner Douglas immediately challenged this view. 1 1 If the rules
and regulations under the 1934 Act had contributed to market "thinness,"
they were the same rules which had been devised to prevent manipulation and
controlled prices, to prevent the excessive use of credit in stock market specu-
lation, to remove the advantages accruing to insiders, and to regulate trading
by professionals. Furthermore, "liquidity" based upon short-term trading by
professionals or excessive speculation by the public brings about an "artificial
instability" which is a "fertile ground for abuse and actual fraud, for distorting
the real prices, by divorcing them, through an intervening speculative enthu-
siasm or despondency, from their economic background."'1 2 His objective
was neither to create "thin" markets nor "thick" markets, but to protect
investors by curbing speculative excesses (which itself was damaging to
the economy) and by the imposition of higher fiduciary standards for stock
market professionals. 133
Invited to speak to the students at the New York Stock Exchange Institute,
a training school for employees of member firms, Commissioner Douglas
used the occasion to discuss the ethics of the brokerage profession and their
impact upon young people entering the profession. 34 He referred "to the
practice of gentlemen teaching youth gentlemanly ways of redistributing the
wealth of their clients so that they may get an inordinate share of it in ex-
travagant ways," and then added:
Our educational system has been too virile in production of men immu-
nized from a sense of feeling of social responsibility, trained in the art of
plunder in gentlemanly ways, imbued with the false ideal that the American
way means exploitation. There has been too little emphasis on the prin-
ciple that the basic essential of an education is the ability to think - to
think in terms of human values, to think in terms of social responsibility,
to think in terms of what the cumulative effect of your daily activities is
in terms of your clients' welfare and of your character135
130. 145 CoMxERCIA. AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 1185 (1937) (Mr. Gay's annual
report to the N.Y.S.E.); N.Y. Times, July 8, 1936, p. 27, col. 1; id. July 12, 1936, § 3,
p. 1, col. 8; id. Nov. 30, 1937, p. 12, col. 2; DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 92
(Allen ed. 1940).
131. His speech on "Margins and Markets" is reprinted in DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY
AND FINANCE 91-106 (Allen ed. 1940).
132. Id. at 103.
133. Id. at 106.
134. This speech on "Customers' Men" aroused a tempest in- the financial corn-
munity. It appears in DOUGLAS, op cit. supra note 130, at 107-19.
135. Id. at 108-09.
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The need to think in these terms is especially imperative in those professions
affected with a public interest such as the brokerage profession, which holds
itself out as rendering independent investment advice.
The investment banking community came in for biting criticism in the
famous "Bond Club Speech," made to the Bond Club of New York.136 They
were told that in large segments of their business a noncompetitive condition
prevailed; that investment bankers had in effect usurped the rights of the
great body of investors and that the condition could only be described as
financial royalism. As a means of breaking the monopoly of finance and elimi-
nating conflicts of interest he proposed that: (1) bankers be removed from
the directorates of industrial companies; (2) underwriting be divorced from
security selling; (3) voting trusts and nonvoting stock - devices by which
the dominant groups engaged in "corporate kidnaping" - should be banned;
and (4) bona fide competitive bidding should be required in the sale of all
corporate issues.' 37
Since Commissioner Douglas was regarded as a likely candidate to succeed
Chairman Landis, who was about to retire, his aggressiveness and passion
for reform, as manifested particularly in these talks, shocked the financial
community and generated considerable hostility to his elevation to the chair-
manship. 3 8 Although the Chairman was elected by the Commission itself,
it was generally understood that the Commission would not appoint anyone
opposed by President Roosevelt. 3 9 Any hopes that the young Commissioner
might be bypassed as "a gracious gesture to the financial community" were
dashed however in September, 1937, when he was elected Chairman of the
Commission.1
40
The new Chairman immediately opened negotiations with the New York
Stock Exchange for the reform and reorganization of the Exchange govern-
ment. But the talks had hardly begun when the stock market suddenly collapsed
in October, 1937. The break, one of the sharpest in market history, touched
off attacks from the financial community attributing the market plunge in
part to overregulation by the government.' 4' After a series of conferences in
136. Id. at 32-45.
137. The speech signaled, the later adoption of the SEC competitive bidding rule
covering debt securities marketed by public utility holding companies and their sub-
sidiaries. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 2676, April 8, 1941; 17 C.F.R. § 250.50
(1949).
138. For magazine comment, see Business Week, April 3, 1937, p. 34; Time, April 5,
1937, p. 71.
139. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1937, p. 25, col. 6.
140. Business Week observed that the Bond Club Speech "lifted Douglas from the
crowd. It ired Wall Street, but it undoubtedly impressed President Roosevelt, who has
never lost any love on the 'money changers,' and it unquestionably influenced the selec-
tion of Douglas as successor to James M. Landis. Douglas had become a 'spokesman' for
the SEC." Business Week, Sept. 25, 1937, p. 60.
141. For one "inside story" of the behind-the-scenes battle between the Old Guard
of the New York Stock Exchange and Chairman Douglas as spokesman of the SEC,
see Rodell, Douglas Over the Stock Exchange, Fortune, Feb. 1938, p. 64.
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which Exchange representatives submitted their plan for reorganization of
the Exchange, negotiations suddenly broke off in November, 1937, when the
Commission made it clear that the proposed reforms were unsatisfactory.
The impasse came to light when Chairman Douglas issued a public statement
warning the Exchange to put its house in order by means of self-regulation or
face more pervasive direct regulation by the Commission under the powers
granted in the 1934 Act.142 To him the time had come for the Exchange to
stop administering its affairs as if it were a private club. For a business so
affected with the public interest, this traditional method of operaton had be-
come archaic. The basic problem centered upon the permissible field of oper-
ation of the floor trader, the specialist and the odd-lot dealers. With statistics
to support him. Douglas contended that there was a strong tendency for the
floor professionals to accentuate market swings by selling short for speculative
profit at a time when the market was declining and buying heavily on margin in
an upward swing, thus contributing to the severity of price fluctuations. These
professional traders were the same group that dominated -the Exchange gov-
ernment and blocked any reform that might limit their profit opportunities. 1 43
Furthermore, the private club atmosphere was not conducive to internal polic-
ing of these professionals for infractions of the Exchange trading rules.
Replying to the threat to reorganize or face further Federal regulation,
President Gay of the New York Stock Exchange defended the existing system
as best serving the public interest.1 4 4 Nevertheless, in December, 1937 he an-
nounced the appointment of the Conway Committee to study the organization
and administration of the Exchange and make recommendations. 145 In Janu-
ary, 1938, the Conway Committee made its report, recommending sweeping
changes as to the Exchange's method of operation. It was proposed that the
board of governors include office partners of member firms, both those based
in New York City and out-of-town, and that three new members of the board
be appointed to represent the public. A new office of chairman of the board
was to be created. A nonmember full-time paid president was to be elected
with authority to appoint all officers except the chairman and vice chairman.
A permanent executive staff was to be developed under the direct supervision
of the President to administer Exchange affairs on a business-like basis, thus
relieving committee members of administrative details and enabling them to
concentrate on policy. By May, 1938, these recommendations had been ap-
proved by the membership and the new rules had become effective.146 The
reorganization met the approval of the Commission and Chairman Douglas
was invited to be the speaker at a dinner given by the Association of Stock
142. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1937, p. 1, col. 5, p. 31, col. 2. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND
FINANCE 63-73 (Allen ed. 1940).
143. Id. at 67-70.
144. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1937, p. 1, col. 7, p. 12, col. 2.
145. The official version of the controversy may be found in 4 SEC ANN. REP. 20-22
(1938).
146. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 506-09.
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Exchange Firms to honor the Conway Committee. In a gracious speech, he
hailed the reorganization as a joint achievement exemplifying the self-regu-
lation principle at its best and called for a joint program to be worked out at
the conference table for increasing the effectiveness of the Exchange as a
vital cog in the financial machinery of the nation.1 47
Largely as a result of the 1938 Exchange reform program, the New York
Stock Exchange now occupies a position of first rank among self-regulatory
institutions. This is not to suggest that all or even most of the problems
which confront the SEC and the Exchange have been solved. Indeed, the
recent SEC Special Study Report disclosed that although the performance of
the Exchange as a self-regulatory agency is quite high there is still an un-
satisfactory discharge of function in some areas. In assessing the reasons for
failure of the system in certain respects the Special Study cites the dispropor-
tionate number of floor professionals in the government of the Exchange,
stemming ultimately from the allocation of voting power under the Exchange
constitution. Other cardinal problems revolve around regulation of floor
traders, specialists and odd-lot dealers, for the basic problem of whether there
should be further segregation of the function of dealer and broker has never
been resolved. The Special Study found that the surveillance program appli-
cable to floor traders and specialists has been inadequate in total effect.'4
Furthermore the Commission is still seeking to devise some way of curbing the
"Customer's" man from using high pressure methods in dealing with the
public and to force brokers to engage in better branch office supervision.14 9
Finally, in the disciplinary area, the Special Study found that the Exchange
still leans toward tenderness rather than severity in meting out punishment;
and that the Exchange still follows the policy of not publicizing the names
of or the penalties imposed upon member firms or persons for infractions of
its rules. 50 Even so, the 1938 reforms established a pattern of self-regulation
that makes the Exchange the exemplar of this method of securities control.
For as Chairman Douglas told a congressional committee at the height of his
confrontation with the Exchange, the key to this form of regulation was to be
found in "... letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government play-
ing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind
the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used."' 51 The lesson of the 1938 reform both for the Exchange
147. DOuGLAs, DMOCACY AND FINANCE 79-91 (Allen ed. 1940).
148. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 550-57, 573-74.
149. Id. pt. 1, at 242-330, 542-44.
150. The present controversy over the role of the specialist, elimination of the floor
trader and the problem of odd-lot trading is merely a continuation of a conflict between
the Commission, and the stock exchanges that has still to be resolved. The arguments for
and against the SEC proposals show no perceptible change over the years. See SEC
SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 504-84.
151. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
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and the Commission is that there is more to be gained by joint cooperation
than by open conflict, so long as the shotgun remains handy.
With stock exchange reform under way, Chairman Douglas pressed for
a similar program of self-regulation among brokers and dealers engaged in the
over-the-counter markets.
C. The NASD - A Venture in Cooperative Regulation of the
Over-the-Counter Markets
The over-the-counter markets pose a baffling problem in securities regula-
tion. At the time of the enactment of the Exchange Act these markets were
somewhat of a mystery. A stock exchange is an organized institution with a
limited and preselected membership. Trading is confined to a choice group
of securities that have met fairly rigorous listing requirements. All transactions
are conducted at a central place, the floor of the exchange; there securities are
bought and sold at public auction at prices that are flashed to brokers' board
rooms throughout the nation by electronic means.
In the over-the-counter markets different conditions prevail. The size of
the market, in terms of the number of issues traded, knows no limits. In 1938,
when the Commission was taking a fresh look at the problem, about 6,000
separate issues of stocks and bonds were being traded on all of the stock
exchanges; however, over-the-counter quotations for at least 60,000 different
issues of securities were being published in the various services to which
brokers and dealers subscribe. Furthermore, of the 6,766 firms of brokers
and dealers registered with the Commission as conducting an over-the-counter
business, only 1,371 were members of an organized exchange.' 52
Brokers and dealers transact business in the over-the-counter market as
market makers in particular stocks or simply act as brokers or dealers.'5 3 The
market actually consists of nothing more than a network of telephone lines
or other forms of communication connecting these firms throughout the coun-
try; trading goes on back and forth frequently at long distances and always
in privacy. Although there are printed lists of bid and asked prices for the
private use of these firms or for newspaper publication, these quotations do
not reflect the actual prices at which a security is being traded and that in-
formation is nowhere accessible.15 4 This lack of information heightens the
regulatory problem. 155 It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1934 when the
Exchange Act was adopted, although the necessity of regulating the over-the-
counter market so as not "to destroy the effects of regulating the organized
152. S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938).
153. The diversity, nature and organization of the wholesale and retail markets are
described in SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2, at 554-658.
154. For a description of the wholesale and retail quotation systems, see SEC
SPECIAL. STUDY pt. 2, at 595-609, 630-43.
155. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2, ch. VII contains a thoroughgoing study of the over-
the-counter markets and goes far to dispel this lack of knowledge.
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exchanges"'156 was generally recognized, the policing problem as such seemed
overwhelming.
The Exchange Act defines the over-the-counter market to include all trans-
actions in securities which take place otherwise than on a national securities
exchange.157 Rather than any specific form of regulation, Congress gave the
Commission a broad grant of power to make such rules in the public interest
as were necessary or appropriate "to insure to investors protection comparable"
to that provided in the Exchange Act for securities traded on one of the stock
exchanges.' 58 Enforcement was to be effected through regulating brokers and
dealers by prohibiting them from using the mails or interstate facilities to
effect transactions in securities outside of the organized exchanges in contra-
vention of the Commission's rules. But the proxy regulation, insider trading
and reporting provisions of the Exchange Act operated directly upon listed
companies; and it was not thought feasible to make "comparable" regulations
applicable to over-the-counter companies which could be reached, if at all, only
indirectly by applying sanctions against dealers trading in their securities. In
1936 the Exchange Act was amended to withdraw this broad delegation. In
its place section 15 was amended to establish a system of registration for
brokers and dealers (other than those whose business was exclusively intra-
state) who use the mails or interstate facilities "to effect any transaction in,
or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security," other than certain exempt
securities. 5 9
We have already noted that this brought almost seven thousand different
firms under the registration provisions, but this was only a beginning to the
solution of the problem. In 1937 the Commission ran an investigation limited
to three areas outside the largest financial centers - Cleveland, Detroit and
the Pacific Northwest. In the space of a few months a team of lawyers and
accountants' uncovered violations which led to the conviction of thirteen in-
dividuals, the indictment of 16 others, injunctions against 17 corporations and
41 individuals and the expulsion or withdrawal of two firms from the securi-
ties business, all for elementary violations of the securities laws. 0° It was
obvious that direct regulation of such numbers of persons in widely scattered
areas would call for an enormous increase of Commission manpower. At
the same time, however, industry self-regulation was impossible under the
unorganized conditions which existed. As Commissioner Matthews described
the problem:
[It] is a little like trying to build a structure out of dry sand. There is
no cohesive force to hold it together, no organization with which we
can build .... I"
156. TwExTzTrH CENTURY FUND, THE SEcURITY MARIxTs 668 (1934).
157. 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1958).
158. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, 48 Stat. 895 (1934).
159. 49 Stat. 1377 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1958).
160. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 152, at 3.
161. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 604.
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It will be recalled that, even before he came to the Commission, Douglas
had advocated a form of securities control "which would combine regulation
by industry with supervision by government.' 62 Although to the stock ex-
changes, at least prior to the 1938 reform program, self-regulation meant
little or no governmental oversight, responsible representatives of the over-
the-counter business themselves sought some form of self-regulation with su-
pervision by the Commission. Senator Maloney of Connecticut, who sponsored
the necessary legislation in the Congress, described this joint effort as "a
system for cooperative regulation of the over-the-counter markets."'16 3
Such an undertaking required some form of institutional organization. The
nucleus for such an organization was provided by the Investment Bankers
Code Committee, which under the National Recovery Administration (NRA)
had prepared and enforced an industry-wide code of fair competition.16 After
the death of the Blue Eagle, the code committee was kept in existence through
the encouragement of the Kennedy and Landis Commissions. 65 In 1935 it
was supplanted by the Investment Bankers Conference Committee, whose func-
tion was to establish a voluntary form of industry self-regulation under SEC
auspices and supervision. The conclusion was soon reached, however, that the
objectives of the organization could not be attained without implementing legis-
lation, particularly legislation providing an exemption from the antitrust
laws.' 66 In October, 1936, a new group emerged, the Investment Bankers
Conference (IBC). In a series of roundtable discussions between the Douglas
Commission and that body, agreement was reached on a joint legislative pro-
gram which culminated in 1938 in the passage of the Maloney Act, adding
section 15A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.167 Chairman Douglas
appraised the alternative approaches to regulation of the over-the-counter
markets and the philosophy underlying the Maloney Act in terms of an ar-
ticulate preference for self-regulation under federal supervision.16
In a nutshell, section 15A authorizes the registration of any association
of brokers and dealers as a national securities association if the Commission
finds certain statutory conditions have been met. These conditions seek to
assure that the composition and internal government of the association will
further the purposes of cooperative regulation. The National Association of
162. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REv. (rLs.) 521, 532 (1934).
163. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 152, at 1; see address of Senator Francis T.
Maloney to California Security Dealers Association, Investment Bankers Association,
and NASD, San Francisco, Aug. 22, 1939, p.3.




167. For the legislative history of the Maloney Act, see S. REP. No. 1455 and H.R.
REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
168. Address before the Bond Club of Hartford, Connecticut, Jan. 7, 1938, printed
in the Conference News, published by the Investment Bankers Conference, Inc., vol. 1,
No. 1lA, Jan. 8, 1938.
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Securities Dealers is the only association thus far registered with the Com-
mission under this section of the Exchange Act. The NASD is a nonprofit
corporation with the clearly stated objective of raising the professional stand-
ards of securities firms engaged in an over-the-counter business.x69
The most complete and recent analysis of the NASD as a self-regulatory
institution is that contained in the SEC Special Study.170 Over the years the
association has grown so that by December 31, 1962 its membership had
reached 4,771, or 83 per cent of the 5,724 firms registered as broker-dealers
under the Exchange Act. Its registered representative program covered
94,444 individuals, comprising the vast majority of the securities salesmen
of the country.171
Under its objectives to promote "high standards of commercial honor" and
"just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of investors" the
association has adopted a number of policies "lying beyond the periphery
of the law in the realm of ethics and morality." Among the most noteworthy
are the "5 per cent mark-up philosophy" ;172 the rule of "suitability" of in-
-vestments for each customer based upon his financial holdings and investment
needs ;173 the rules against churning and excessive activity ;174 the interpre-
tation of the rules of fair practice to prohibit "free-riding and withholding"
by participants in underwritings ;176 and the recent practice of reviewing
members' offerings of unseasoned companies to determine whether the un-
derwriting arrangements are fair and reasonable, under all of the circum-
stances of the offering. 76 These innovations support the view of the Special
169. The Certificate of Incorporation states the following objects of the association:
(1) To promote through cooperative effort the investment banking and secu-
rities business, to standardize its principles and practices, to promote therein high
standards of commercial honor, and to encourage and promote among members
observance of Federal and State securities laws;
(2) To provide a medium through which its membership may be enabled to
confer, consult, and cooperate with governmental and other agencies in the solu-
tion of problems affecting investors, the public, and the investment banking and
securities business;
(3) To adopt, administer, and enforce rules of fair practice and rules to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and in general to promote just
and equitable principles of trade for the protection of investors;
(4) To promote self-discipline among members, and to investigate and adjust
grievances between the public and members and between members....
170. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 602-82.
171. Id. at 603.
172. The policy is stated in NASD MANUAL, p. G-1. And see JENNINGS & MARSH,
SEctrTIES REGULATION-CASEs 719-21. The genesis, scope and effectiveness of the policy
are described in SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2, at 645-53.
173. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1, at 308-14. For an application of the rule, see Boren
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6367, Sept. 19, 1960.
174. SEC SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 658.
175. Id. at 660-61.
176. See Current Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers, A Symposium
of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, San Francisco, Aug. 6,
1962, 18 Bus. LAW. 27, 44-48 (1962) ; SEC SPEcI.AL STUDY pt. 4, at 661.
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Study that "the NASD has many important accomplishments to its credit,
and its history evidences a clear desire to expand the role of self-regulation
in the total regulatory scheme and to make self-regulation work.' 1 7 Never-
theless, the Special Study concludes that the NASD has fallen short of its
potential as a self-regulatory institution primarily because it has consciously
chosen to administer its affairs and enforce its disciplinary rules largely
through its own nonpaid membership rather than through the development
of a professional staff adequate to discharge its regulatory responsibilities. In
other words, the NASD finds itself substantially in the same administrative
impasse that the Conway committee found the New York Stock Exchange
in 1937.178 Although the building of an enlarged staff will mean'additional
expense for the membership, the relatively brief history of the association
indicates that the membership is prepared to finance the costs entailed in
modifying and strengthening its organizational structure. In any event, how-
ever, the association's record of accomplishment has fulfilled the expectations
which Chairman Douglas held out for it in 1938.
In April, 1939 Douglas departed from the Chairman's office of the SEC
for the Supreme Court of the United States. In the words of Mr. Arthur
Krock: ".... having been so suddenly lifted from the bullring to the stratosphere
of public service the smell of blood and sand . . . [was] still strong in his
nostrils.... [H]e discussed the commission and its problems as though they
were to remain as much a part of his life as they were a couple of weeks ago.' 7 9
To him the activities of the commission had reached'their practical peak. The
task of the future, as he saw it, was "to tighten and lubricate the machine,
smooth and perfect its action and somewhat readjust its governor."'i80 He
warned against an increase in the size or functions of the agency: "Men soon
reach the limit of our resources and capabilities. The wise thing to do is to
recognize that limit and not attempt to stretch it."'' On the legislative side,
he proposed that at some future time an eminent drafting committee, repre-
senting all legitimate interests, should undertake to consolidate and perfect
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, to eliminate duplications, ambigui-
ties and what are probably some unintended exactions on honest business.
With his departure the Douglas era in the Commission's history ended, but
his philosophy is still a pervading force in policy making by that body.
III. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS ON CORPORATE AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Considering the whole range of cases relating to economic law, those in-
volving questions of corporate reorganizations and of corporate and .securities
regulation do not bulk large in the work of the Supreme Court. Over the
177. SEC SPEcrA.L STUDY pt. 4, at 673.
178. See note 145 supra.
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last quarter century, however, Mr. Justice Douglas has continued to exert
a powerful influence on the path of the law in these fields through a number
of landmark opinions. 182
A. Corporate Reorganizations
1. The rule of "absolute priority." Some of the Justice's most controversial
opinions in corporate reorganizations have dealt with two rival theories con-
cerning the priorities to be accorded various classes of security holders. Com-
peting for supremacy were the theories of "absolute priority" and of "relative
priority." The objective in reorganizations is to continue the business, rather
than liquidate and pay off the security holders in cash. "Fairness" requires
that the new securities be distributed among the various classes of security
holders, according to their priorities. The theory of "absolute priority," as
commonly understood, would require that, in the hierarchy of claims, senior
securities should always receive securities having a "value" equal to principal
plus unpaid interest (or liquidation value plus accrued dividends in the case
of stock) before anything could be given to the next class of securities. By
one of those odd coincidences that enliven history, the rival "relative priority"
theory was that advocated by Robert T. Swaine, Justice Douglas' old mentor.
In 1927 in a lecture before the Bar Association of the City of New York,
Swaine traced the judicial treatment of the Boyd case11s3 in subsequent de-
cisions and concluded:
The rule as I see it, and as I believe it will ultimately be developed by
the courts, is that the relative priorities of the old securities, senior to
the most junior securities which continue to have any interest in the
property, must not be inequitably disturbed.18
4
In general, the "absolute priority" theory tended to respect the contractual
rights of the various parties and to favor the senior security holders over the
junior claims and equity interests. The "relative priority" theory, on the
other hand, left a greater opportunity for negotiation as between the senior
and junior securities, so long as their relative rights were not "inequitably
disturbed." Thus, it came to be known as the "composition theory."' 8 5 Since
the junior securities were more likely to be identified with management of
the debtor, corporate reorganizers allied with the debtor's management or
its bankers were inclined to advocate the theory of "relative priority." The
controversy was ventilated in the now classic article by Bonbright and Ber-
182. COUNTRYMAN, DOUGLAS OF THE SUPEME COURT (1959) contains a biographical
sketch of the Justice and a representative selection of his opinions.
183. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, supra note 56.
184. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last
Decade, 27 CoLum. L. IEv. 901, 907 (1927) (emphasis supplied); 8 LEcTURES ON LEGAL
Topics 133, 142 (1931).
185. Rostow & Cutler, supra note 113, at 1355; SEC REPORT pt. VIII, at 145 (1940);




german in which they weighed the merits of the two rival theories. 186 They
noted that the issue had been sharply drawn in the famous St. Paul reorgani-
zation,117 where the Committee representing the dissenting bondholders con-
tended, among other things, that the plan of reorganization (defended by
Mr. Swaine) was unduly favorable to the stockholders. The failure of these
objections to persuade the courts led -these writers to speculate whether there
had not been a judicial rejection of the absolute priority doctrine. 88
After a decade of controversy over these rival theories, the problem reached
the Supreme Court in the famous Los Angeles Lumber case, 8 9 decided in
1939 and the Consolidated Rock Products case 190 decided in 1941. Mr. Justice
Douglas spoke for an unanimous Court in each case.
The Los Angeles Lumber case involved a section 77B reorganization of a
company having an outstanding bond issue representing a liability of principal
and interest of some $3,800,000. The district court found that the debtor's
total assets did not exceed $900,000 and that it was insolvent both in the
equity and bankruptcy sense. The plan of reorganization,. prepared by man-
agement, called for the transfer of the assets to a new company having a
capital structure of 1,000,000 shares of $1 voting stock, divided into 811,375
shares of preferred and 188,625 shares of common. After the reservation of
170,000 shares of preferred for sale to raise money to rehabilitate the plant,
641,375 shares were to be issued to the bondholders, 250 shares in exchange
for each $1,000 bond. The old Class A shareholders were to receive the entire
188,625 shares of common without the payment of any fresh money. The plan
had received the assent of more than ninety per cent of the face amount of
the bonds, the Class A stock, and the Class B stock.
The plan was attacked by plaintiff-bondholders on the ground that it was
not "fair and equitable" to this class of creditors within the meaning of
section 77B(f) of the Bankruptcy Act,' 19 the predecessor of section 221 of
the present Bankruptcy Act. 92 The district court made a finding of fairness
on the basis, among other things, that it would be an asset of value to the
new company to retain the old Class A stockholders in the business because
of their "familiarity with the operation" of the business, their "financial stand-
ing and influence in the community," and because they gave "continuity of
management."'9 13 After affirmance by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari because of the "contrariety ... in practical administra-
tion of the [Bankruptcy] Act among the circuits."'1 94
186. Bonbright & Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security
Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 127 (1928).
187. See note 5 supra.
188. Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 186, at 153.
189. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
190. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
191. 48 Stat. 919 (1934).
192. 52 Stat. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1958).
193. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1939).
194. Id. at 109.
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Speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court reversed. In
a notable opinion, familiar to every reorganization lawyer, the Justice laid
down these propositions: (1) if the plan is not fair and equitable as a matter
of law the court cannot confirm it even though consents are obtained from
the statutory majorities of the various classes of security holders; (2) the
words "fair and equitable" as used in the statute are "words of art which
prior to the advent of section 77B had acquired a fixed meaning" through
judicial interpretations in equity receivership reorganizations; (3) this "fixed
principle" as enunciated in the Boyd and succeeding cases establishes the rule
of "full and absolute priority" whereby, when the corporation is insolvent,
the creditors are entitled to their full right of priority against the corporate
assets; and (4) when the corporation is insolvent the junior creditor or
shareholder's participation "must be based on a contribution in money or in
money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the
participation of the stockholder." 195 In' this aspect, the supposed benefits ac-
cruing to the corporation from a continuance of the shareholders' participation
did not fulfill the "reasonably equivalent" test. Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas
noted that although the relative priorities of the bondholders and the old Class
A stockholders had been maintained "by virtue of the priorities accorded the
preferred stock which the bondholders are to receive . . .," this did not satisfy
the "fairness" test. 96 In view of this language, the case was hailed as estab-
lishing the rule of absolute priority and as marking the demise of the rule of
relative priority.19 7 However, the total value of the assets did not exceed
25 per cent of the creditors' claim and they received nothing for the remainder;
it is therefore doubtful that even the rule of relative priority as enunciated
by Mr. Swaine had been satisfied. 198
Although generally approving the tenor of the Los Angeles Lumber case,
Professor Dodd, in a prescient article, pointed out a number of difficulties in
its application. 9 9 If the minority creditors may insist upon the exclusion of
the shareholders from participation where there is a finding that insolvency
exists, may they also insist that such participation shall not be permitted unless
the district court affirmatively finds that solvency does exist? Where the issue
of insolvency gives rise to honest doubts, cannot the question of the existence
of assets in excess of debts be compromised on some reasonable basis, despite
the objection of minority creditors? Furthermore, would there not be a ten-
dency of the lower courts to give the junior creditors a break and circumvent
the rule by taking an optimistic view of the "value" of the enterprise in view
195. Id. at 122.
196. Id. at 119-20.
197. See Note, Distribution of Securities in Corporate Reorganizationt, 51 YALE L.J.
85, 86 (1941).
198. See Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HAzv. L. REv. 1193, 1205 (1943).
199. Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications,
53 HA~v. L. Rnv. 713 (1940).
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of that word's chameleonic character? And when solvency is found to exist,
would the Court insist that the participation of the senior classes must be
fully compensatory? If so, the practical necessity of obtaining the consent
of the junior classes will often make it impracticable to compensate the senior
security holders to the full extent of their claims. He predicted, therefore:
*.. that district judges who have found that a junior class does have an
equity will find ways of sustaining reorganization plans which permit
substantial participation by the members of that class, even where some
blurring of what may seem to be the legal principles of the Los Angeles
Co. case is necessary to justify the decision. It may also be surmised that,
if the blurring of those principles is not made too apparent, such decisions
will, for the most part, be sustained by circuit courts of appeals, and that
petitions for certiorari addressed to the Supreme Court will be denied.
Otherwise, the whole scheme for reorganization established by the
Chandler Act will be made unworkable.20
Mr. Justice Douglas had another opportunity to clarify the scope of the ab-
solute priority rule in the Consolidated Rock Products case.20 1 That case con-
cerned the fairness of a plan of reorganization under section 77B of a parent
company and its two wholly-owned subsidiary corporations. Each subsidiary
had outstanding bond issues with interest in default. Although the corporate
entities of the subsidiaries had been preserved, pursuant to an operating
agreement, the enterprise had been operated as a unit with commingling of
assets, the parent undertaking to service the debt and settle accounts upon
termination of the agreement. Under the plan of reorganization, bondholders
of the subsidiary corporations were to receive income bonds and preferred
stock for their claims to principal; however, their claims to accrued interest
were to be extinguished without the receipt of any new securities. The pre-
ferred shares of the parent were to be allowed to participate by receiving one
share of new common for each old share of preferred. This treatment rested
upon a finding by the district court that the value of the assets of the three
companies was in excess of the total bonded indebtedness of the subsidiaries,
including accrued and unpaid interest. That court further determined, how-
ever, that it would be impossible to segregate the properties originally be-
longing to each company and arrive at the assets and earnings allocable to
each class of securities. On this state of the record the district court found
the plan fair and equitable.
When the case reached the Supreme Court Mr. Justice Douglas, writing
for a unanimous court, disagreed with the district court and affirmed the
Court of Appeals. He observed that under the applicable statute the district
court must exercise an "informed, independent judgment" of the fairness of
the plan. To discharge its responsibility, the court must make a finding of
value "so that criteria will be available to determine an appropriate allocation
of new securities between bondholders and stockholders in case there is an
200. Id. at 751-52.
201. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
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equity remaining after the bondholders have been made whole. '20 2 The
proper method of valuation, was by means of capitalization of prospective
earnings. Furthermore, a determination of whether earnings may reasonably
be expected to meet the earnings and dividend requirements of the new se-
curities is a necessary element in a finding that the plan is not only "fair and
equitable," but that it is feasible. It is also essential for satisfaction of the
absolute priority rule, which applies to reorganizations of solvent as well as
insolvent companies. As in the Los Angeles Lumber case, Mr. Justice Douglas
took the view that the relative priorities had been maintained, because the
bondholders had received for the principal amount of the old 6% bonds new
5 % income bonds and preferred stock of an equal face amount. This view is
questionable, however, since the proposed plan failed to compensate the bond-
holders for the loss of accrued interest. Although Douglas was of the view
that the absolute priority rule does not mean that senior classes cannot be given
inferior grades of securities to the old securities, or even securities of the
same class as that received by the junior interests, they must "receive, in ad-
dition, compensation for the senior rights which they are to surrender.
20 3
"Full compensatory provision must be made for the entire bundle of rights
which the creditors surrender.
20 4
After having said this, however, we are told that the method of effecting
full compensation will vary depending upon the particular case. Then comes
the puzzling statement which seems to leave everything up in the air:
[W]hether in case of a solvent company the creditors should be made
whole for the change in loss of their seniority by an increased participation
in assets, in earnings or in control, or in any combination thereof, will
be dependent on the facts and requirements of each case. So long as the
new securities offered are of a value equal to the creditors' claims, the
appropriateness of the formula employed rests in the informed discretion
of the court 20 5
There was obviously something of comfort to everyone - to the senior
classes who could insist upon being "fully compensated" in new securities
having a present market value equal to the face amount, including accrued
interest on the old securities; and to the junior classes who could argue that
the determination of a precise dollar value for the new securities was im-
possible, impracticable and never intended.
The Consolidated Rock Products case soon led to some startling results.
A number of Section 77 railroad reorganizations had been wending their way
through the Interstate Commerce Commission in the depression and post
depression years. When the Western Pacific206 and Milwaukee 2 cases
202. Id. at 524.
203. Id. at 529.
204. Id. at 528.
205. Id. at 529-30.
206. In re Western Pac. R.R. Co., 124 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1941).
207. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 124 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1942).
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reached the Courts of Appeal, the junior interests, dissatisfied with their lot,
successfully attacked the findings of the Commission on the basis that it had
failed to make specific findings of dollar values of the properties, old claims,
and new securities as compelled by section 77(e) of the Bankruptcy Act and
the Consolidated Rock Products case. Under the circumstances the statute
required either that the court dismiss the action or send it back to the Com-
mission for further action. This not only meant further delay but cast a shadow
over several other reorganizations of major railroads.20
At this point the Supreme Court took over the Western Pacific and Mil-
waukee cases, reversed the decisions of the Courts of Appeal and reinstated
the orders of the district courts which had approved the plans of reorganization
as certified by the Commission. Mr. Justice Reed wrote the opinion in Western
Pacific,2 0 Mr. Justice Douglas in the Milwaukee case.210
The two questions left open in Consolidated Rock Products were now put
to rest. In the Milwaukee case, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in de-
termining the permissible capitalization, had made an extensive review of
the properties, business, and earnings of the debtor. It determined a maximum
capitalization in a total dollar amount, after giving consideration to "the
past and prospective earnings of the debtor and other relevant facts." It then
determined the reasonable limits on fixed interest, new debt securities, and
reasonable dividends to be paid on the new preferred, in the light of prospec-
tive earnings after taxes, and determined that the old preferred and common
had "no value." Relying on the Consolidated Rock Products case, the junior
classes contended that this did not satisfy the requirement of a specific finding
as to value. To this Mr. Justice Douglas replied that since a valuation based
on earning power is essentially a multi-factoral appraisal followed by a pre-
diction for which there is no fixed formula, the Court could not say that the
Commission had fallen into error or that the District Court's finding of "no
value" was unjustified.21 1
As for the contention by senior classes that they were entitled to be fully
compensated for the principal amount of their claims, including accrued and
unpaid interest, by receiving new securities having a presently realizable
equivalent market value, before the next junior class could participate, Mr.
Justice Douglas had this to say:
A requirement that dollar values be placed on what each security holder
surrenders and on what he receives would create an illusion of certainty
where none exists and would place an impracticable burden on the whole
208. The alarm was sounded in Bourne, Findings of "Value" in Railroad Reorgani-
fations, 51 YALE L.J. 1057 (1942). And see Comment, Effect of the Consolidated Rock
Products Decision on Railroad Reorganizationrs under Section 77, 51 YALE L.J. 967
(1942).
209. Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
210. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 318 U.S. 523
(1943).
211. Id. at 542.
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reorganization process. See Bourne, Findings of "Value" in Railroad
Reorganizations, 51 Yale L.Journ. 1957. It is sufficient that each security
'holder in the order of his priority receives from that which is available
for the satisfaction of his claim the equitable equivalent of the rights
surrendered. That requires a comparison of the new securities allotted
to him with the old securities which he exchanges to determine whether
the new are the equitable equivalent of the old. But that determination
cannot be made by the use of any mathematical formula. Whether in
a given case senior creditors have been made whole or received "full
compensatory treatment" rests in the informed judgment of the Com-
mission and the District Court on consideration of all relevant facts. 212
When the smoke had disappeared, Mr. Swaine, who had argued and won
the Western Pacific case in the Supreme Court, summarized the "fixed prin-
ciples" of the absolute priority rule this way:
Thus the fullness of the compensation or payment, the making whole,
the application of the full value of the property, the absolute and strict
recognition of priority, all seem to be positional or comparative - i.e.
relative. Even in respect of relative positions in assets and earnings the
words "absolute" and "strict" are to be taken in a much less "absolute"
or "strict" sense than they might seem to imply. A senior securityholder
may be given treatment in the same class of securities as is allotted to
junior creditors provided the terms of the allotment to the senior credi-
tors are sufficiently more favorable. This is evidenced not only by the
actual treatment of the securities approved in the two cases but also by
express language in both opinions.2 13
This post-depression battle has ended, but the war of words has yet to be
resolved. The controversy, however, was largely one of semantics; and should
another economic crisis arise, the degree of expected government involvement
would in all probability make much of this learning irrelevant.2 1 4
1 2. Chapter X or Chapter XI? We have already alluded to the clash be-
tween Chapter X and Chapter XI arising from the differences in origin and
philosophy of these diverse roads for effecting a reorganization of a financially
embarrassed corporation. 215 In its original form Chapter X specifically pro-
vided that petitions for relief thereunder should be dismissed if "adequate
relief would be obtainable" under Chapter XI.21 6 No comparable provision
was contained in Chapter XI. In SEC v. United States Realty & Improve-
212. Id. at 565-66.
213. Swaine, supra note 198, at 1208-09.
214. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L.
REv. 565 (1950); Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders iin Bankruptcy Reor-
ganization: New Directions, 67 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1954) ; Blum, The "New Directions"
for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 1367 (1954);
Billyou, "New Directions": A Further Comment, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1379 (1954); Blum.
Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate Reorganizations: A Reappraisal, 25
U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1958).
215. See text following note 113 supra.




went Co.,2 17 the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to block a middle-
sized, real estate investment company from utilizing Chapter XI to effect
an arrangement with unsecured creditors, instead of complying with the more
rigorous requirements of Chapter X. The debtor had 900,000 shares of com-
mon listed on the New York Stock Exchange and held by some 7,000 share-
holders. Furthermore, the debt securities as to which the debtor sought an
adjustment were owned by 900 creditors. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas not participating, sustained the right of the Commission to intervene
as a means of performing its "important public duties" under Chapter X.
The Court emphasized the differences in purpose and function of the two
chapters and concluded that it was incumbent upon a district court to measure
the adequacy of relief available under each chapter "in the light of its effect
on all the public and private interests concerned including those of the
debtor.'218 The court was of the view that the plan proposed would not meet
the "fair and equitable" test of absolute priority as laid down in Los Angeles
Lunber, since such protection could not be assured the unsecured creditors
"without some re-arrangement" of the stockholders' rights. This was forbidden
under Chapter XI and could only be effectuated under Chapter X.219
With this foothold, it appeared that the SEC was in a position to preserve
the integrity of the reorganization process as embodied in its 1938 reform
program in respect of large companies with widely held securities, resulting
in the separation of ownership and control. Moreover, in 1952 Congress
amended Chapter XI specifically to permit the Commission to intervene in
Chapter XI proceedings and have the matter shifted to Chapter X, if the
judge finds "that the proceedings should have been brought under Chapter
X." 2 20 At the same time Congress amended section 366 so that confirmation
of Chapter XI arrangements no longer hinges upon a finding that the plan
is "fair and equitable" as well as feasible ;221 the new test for confirmation
requires only that the court be satisfied that the arrangement "is for the best
interests of the creditors and is feasible." Furthermore, as if to underline
the fact that the absolute priority rule of the Los Angeles Lumber case was
no longer to be applicable by virtue of the elimination of the "fair and equitable"
standard, a sentence was added specifying that confirmation shall not be
refused "solely because ... if the debtor is a corporation, the interests of its
stockholders or members will be preserved under the arrangement.
222
In General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky,2 3 a debtor corporation petitioned
under Chapter XI for an arrangement of its unsecured debts. None of the
debts were evidenced by any publicly held security, although the corporation's
217. 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
218. Id. at 455.
219. See note 114 supra.
220. 66 Stat. 432 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1958).
221. 66 Stat, 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1958).
222. Ibid.
223. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
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over two million shares of common stock were listed on the American Stock
Exchange and were held by over seven thousand shareholders. A single share-
holder and the SEC moved to have the proceedings dismissed or shifted to
Chapter X. The district court, relying on the United States Realty case,
granted the request on the basis that court supervision over a reorganization
of a corporation of this size and character was necessary; and the Court of
Appeals affirmed by a divided court.
With Mr. Justice Douglas writing the opinion for the majority, the Supreme
Court affirmed. The Court, however, rejected the factors of size and public
ownership of the securities as the sole determinants of the choice between the
two chapters.
It may well be that in most cases where the debtor's securities are publicly
held c. X will afford the more appropriate remedy. But that is not ne-
cessarily so. A large company with publicly held securities may have as
much need for a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller com-
pany. And there is no reason we can see why c. XI may not serve that
end. The essential difference is not between the small company and the
large company but between the needs to be served.224
The Court suggested various factors which the lower courts should take into
account in deciding which chapter would best meet these needs: the need to
investigate fraud or imprudent management, the past financial history, the
complexities of the capital and debt structure, the classes of securities in need
of adjustment, and the possibility of success of the arrangement without undue
prejudice to creditors. Although the latter factor seems to include the absolute
priority ingredient, Mr. Justice Douglas made no mention of the 1952 amend-
ments to Chapter XI and their possible bearing upon the problem. Not so
the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter; he read the 1952
amendments as compelling a more sympathetic judicial attitude toward Chap-
ter XI. Since none of the creditors, and only a single shareholder and the
Commission, had objected to the use of Chapter XI, it was his view that the
district court had abused its discretion by diverting the proceeding to Chapter X.
Whatever may be thought to be the preferable judicial approach to the
problem, the indecisiveness and ambivalence of the majority opinion has been
a source of confusion for the lower courts. Much seems to depend upon a
judge's view of the efficacy of the "composition" approach to reorganizations
with its latitude for "negotiations" between the various interests, on the one
hand, or his conviction that the safeguards embodied in Chapter X have
utility.2- 5 This polarity of position most recently appeared in the Second
224. Id. at 466.
225. No discernible pattern has developed in the lower courts. Dismissal under Chap-
ter XI was directed in SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240 F2d 511 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); Mecca Temple, Etc. v. Darrock, 142 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 784 (1944) ; In re Barchris Constr. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963). Retention under Chapter XI was sustained in In re American Trailer Rentals
Co., 325 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. granted; Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC,
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Circuit in Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC.226 In that case the debtor
corporation, a large retail chain, in 1961 underwent a change in top man-
agement as the result of the purchase of control shares by a new group. The
new management immediately embarked upon a program of rapid expansion,
relying primarily on short-term bank financing with a view to repla ing it
with long-term financing in a rising securities market, only to be caught short
by the 1962 market collapse. The corporation petitioned for an arrangement
of its unsecured obligations, in excess of twenty million dollars, under Chapter
XI. The SEC resisted on the basis that debtor's difficulties bad arisen from
the ineptness of management and that public stockholders could best be pro-
tected by the appointment of an independent trustee and the application of
the supervisory procedures of Chapter X. The debtor countered with self-
serving affidavits of the corporate managers, trade creditors and labor repre-
sentatives that the cumbersome procedures of Chapter X would make it im-
possible to retain "key employees" or obtain trade credit from suppliers of
merchandise; and that the corporation would be unable to continue in business
and pay its debts if reorganized under Chapter X. On the strength of this
"substantially uncontradicted factual showing," the trial court exercised its
discretion to permit the Chapter XI arrangement to proceed and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, found no clear principle to be
derived from earlier cases, including those of the Supreme Court. Insofar as
the United States Realty decision rested upon the "fair and equitable" foun-
dation, it seemed to him a fair assumption that this had been undermined
by the 1952 amendment eliminating the "fair and equitable" requirement from
Chapter XI. He noted that this was the view of the minority in General Stores;
to him the position of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority on this
point was not "altogether clear. ' 227 In any event, in the face of the uncon-
tradicted evidence of the "drastic financial consequences of a transfer to Chapter
X" - evidence that it was incumbent upon the SEC to come forward and
rebut - he was not prepared to say the district court bad abused its discretion.
On the other hand, the late Judge Clark, in one of his last opinions, dissented
from these views in connection with the SEC's petition for rehearing en banc.228
To him the case presented all of the criteria emphasized by the Supreme Court
in the United States Realty and General Stores decisions as requiring reor-
ganizations under SEC supervision in Chapter X proceedings rather than
320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963) ; In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 272 F.2d 769'(3d Cir. 1959), vacated
as moot, sub norn. SEC v. Lea Fabrics, Inc., 363 U.S. 417 (1960); SEC v. Wilcox-Gay
Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956) ; In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
226. 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Comment, Discretion Properly Exercised
i; Relying on Busin-ess Prospects to Allow Chapter XI Arrangement of Large Corporate
Debtor, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 155 (1964).
227. 320 F.2d 940, 948 (2d Cir. 1963).
228. Id. at 950.
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in an unsupervised arrangement under Chapter XI. As for the 1952 amend-
ments, the addition to section 328 codified the holding of United States Realty
insofar as it related to SEC intervention. The addition to section 366 had
nothing to do with the question of which chapter was to be required in a
particular case; it dealt solely with the test for confirmation under Chapter
XI after that choice had been made and the arrangement consummated as a
substantive matter. To Judge Clark, this crucial decision put the law back
"a quarter of a century." And with an oblique reference to recent "friendly
criticism" of administrative agencies, not directed, however, at the SEC,2 29
Judge Clark concluded:
Now it appears that the battle for public supervision won in 1940 has all
to be done again - if it can be rewon after this setback. It has been
vigorously asserted that the regulatory agencies have been grievously at
fault in not announcing rules and principles upon which they act. As
concerns this agency, however, it would seem that it has had to expend
so much of its time and energy in even maintaining a foothold on that
regulation for which Congress had created it that it has little oppor-
tunity to build much beyond this.
230
And so the matter rests for the moment. Unless there is a change in judicial
attitude, or the SEC throws its front line troops into the fray and irons the
kinks out of Chapter X procedures, or the Supreme Court lays down more
specific guidelines, "the creditors groups who sponsored Chapter XI will
have more than they bargained for, and the reformist aims of those who
drafted Chapter X will be defeated. 2 3 1 Curiously enough, Mr. Justice Doug-
las' opinion in the General Stores case has contributed significantly to this
result.
3. Elevation of fiduciary standards. Although the Lea Bill,232 looking toward
the reform of protective committees, failed to gain the support of Congress,
some of its objectives have been achieved by the judicial gloss which the Court
has placed on the Bankruptcy Act and by the infusion of equitable principles
into bankruptcy jurisprudence. In these trends, Mr. Justice Douglas has been
a major force. Through one of his early opinions the Court set aside a com-
position plan under which a municipality proposed to adjust its debts, because
a fiscal agent retained by the city had interests which conflicted with those
of other creditors and the facts had not been disclosed prior to the solicitation
of their consents. The Court laid down the doctrine that a bankruptcy court,
as a court of equity, must scrutinize the circumstances under which assent
from a class of creditors is obtained; where such investigation
discloses the existence of unfair dealing, a breach of fiduciary obligations,
profiting from a trust, special benefits for the reorganizers, or the need
229. See FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIEs (1962). For an earlier
view of the reorganization process, see Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate
Reorganizations Act, 48 HARv. L. Ray. 39, 41-48 (1934).
230. 320 F.2d at 953.
231. Rostow & Cutler, supra note 113, at 1337.
232. See note 111 suPra.
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for protection of investors against an inside few, or of one class of in-
vestors from the encroachments of another, the court has ample power
to adjust the remedy to meet the need.233
The principle was later applied in a Chapter X proceeding to deny absolutely
the claims of an indenture trustee, a bondholders' committee, and their counsel
for fees and expenses, because in their respective roles they had assumed con-
flicting positions to various investor groups to whom they owed a duty of
undivided loyalty.2 34
It will be recalled that under equity receivership reorganizations the practice
had been to fix the fees and expenses by private arrangement, free of judicial
control.23 5 In Chapter X proceedings, however, section 221 specifies that all
payments for costs and expenses "by the debtor ... or by any other person"
in connection with the proceedings are made subject to approval by the judge
as a condition to confirmation. 23 6 In Leirnan v. Guttman, 3 7 the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Douglas, construed section 221 broadly to give the bank-
ruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over the reasonableness of compensation
for services, costs or expenses, whether paid by the debtor or by outside
sources pursuant to private arrangement.2 38 In contrast to Chapter X, Chapter
XI is more restrictive in allowance of compensation to committees or repre-
sentatives of creditors or stockholders; yet it permits compensation for serv-
ices to be paid from outside sources, free of judicial supervision.2 39 This
enables legal counsel for the various interests to agree in advance as to fees
and expenses and arrange for "excess" or noncompensatory payments to be
made privately.240
The trend toward imposing a more rigorous fiduciary standard on persons
involved in reorganization proceedings is exemplified by the recent case of
Wolf v. Weinstein.2 4 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan,
233. American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146
(1940).
234. Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941). Cf. Dickinson
Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 388 (1940) ; Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178
(1944).
235. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
236. 52 Stat. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621(4) (1958) (emphasis added).
237. 336 U.S. 1 (1949). Cf. SEC v. Drexel & Co., 348 U.S. 341 (1955).
238. Mr. Justice Jackson dissented insofar as the decision purported to reach agree-
ments between stockholders and counsel which did not affect funds of the estate or of a
stockholders' protective committee. It seemed to him that the decision, converted a statute
"designed to prevent lawyers from overreaching stockholders into an. authority for stock-
holders to swindle lawyers." 336 U.S. at 11.
239. Compare Bankruptcy Act, §§ 48, 337 [74 Stat. 198 (1960), 72 Stat. 821 (1958),
11 U.S.C. § 76 (Supp. III, 1962), 737 (1958)], with §§ 221, 242 [52 Stat. 897, 900
(1958), 11 U.S.C. §§ 621, 642 (1958)].
240. Rumors persist as to allocation of perquisites among members of the Bankruptcy
establishment and of the fixing of fe.es in advance by mutual agreement. The statute in-
vites such arrangements, whether or not such back scratching actually occurs in practice.
There seems to be enough smoke to warrant legislative investigation.
241. 372 U.S. 633 (1963).
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construed section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act 242 as requiring an officer and
director of a debtor corporation in a Chapter X proceeding to disgorge profits
made from trading in the stock of the debtor, without the consent or approval
of the court. 243 This line of decisions concerning compensation in reorganiza-
tions, as well as the application of the theory of absolute priority insofar as
it limits the extent of participation by the junior classes of debt and shares,
has removed some of the incentives for involvement of bankers and their
counsel in masterminding reorganizations. The results of the cases have been
arrived at through a blending of statutory and judicial controls over the re-
organization process. Only Chapter XI remains as a possible avenue of escape.
B. Securities Regulation
Mr. Justice Douglas has written surprisingly few opinions in this field.
Each case, however, has raised an important question of state or federal regu-
lation, the members of the Court being sharply divided in their opinions.
At the state level, Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Corntn'n., 244 a 5-4 decision, raised the question of the power of Virginia to
apply its Blue Sky Law to a Nebraska insurance association. The association
conducted a mail order health insurance business in Virginia by inducing its
old Virginia members gratuitously to solicit and forward applications for mem-
bership and insurance to the Nebraska home office. The Virginia Corporation
Commission commenced cease and desist proceedings under the state statute
which permitted services of process by registered mail upon the association
in Nebraska. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, sustained the
jurisdiction of Virginia against the claim of the insurance company that, since
all of its activities were conducted outside of the state, service by registered
mail offended due process conceptions. The majority opinion emphasized that
the systematic solicitation of new prospects had established sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice," the standard developed in International Shoe.24 5 Although Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred, he also wrote a separate opinion. He thought the problem
was broader than that of the scope of procedural due process; it concerned
the power of a state to enforce its securities laws against out-of-state issuers
operating through the use of gratuitous agents within the state. He was not
concerned with the amount of solicitation in quantitative terms: "Whether
such solicitation is isolated or continuous, it is activity which Virginia can
regulate. '246 Mr. Justice Minton, with whom Mr. Justice Jackson joined,
dissented on the ground that since the association had not been hurt - the
242. 52 Stat. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1958).
243. Mr. Justice Douglas voted with the majority. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion is
sprinkled with references to Douglas? earlier views as to the scope of § 249 while Chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
244. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
245. International Shoe Co. v. Washington-, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
246. 339 U.S. 643, 654 (1950) (concurring opinion).
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state only sought to publicize the cease and desist order - the procedural
due process issue had not yet been reached. Justices Reed and Frankfurter
agreed with the majority in reaching the merits, but on the merits joined the
dissent. It is apparent from the four-way split that the dissenting Justices
were fearful of a shift in doctrine along the lines suggested by Mr. Justice
Douglas. Nevertheless, Professor Loss is quite correct in his view, that
Travelers Health "on its facts is not a square holding that the law of the state
of the buyer's residence could not be constitutionally applied to a single isolated
transaction of the type under discussion." 247 At the same time, however, Loss
saw "no good constitutional reason" against applying a non-resident securities
statute framed along the lines of the non-resident motorists statutes ;248 and,
as principal draftsman, he included such a provision in the Uniform Securities
Act.249 The constitutionality of such a statute now seems secure as a result
of the McGee case.250 The Minnesota supreme court has so held.2- 1
At the federal level, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 252 raised the
question whether so-called "variable annuity" coritracts written by some in-
surance companies are nonexempt "securities" under the Securities Act of
1933 and whether such companies were subject to the Inve~tment Company
Act of 1940. Section 3 (a) (8) of the Securities Act exempts "insurance" and
"annuity" contracts when "subject to the supervision of the insurance com-
missioner ... of any State .... ,,253 Admittedly, this clause exempts the fixed-
return annuities, traditionally issued by insurance companies, under which
the annuitant is to receive a definite periodic payment beginning at some
future date. In recent years, however, the variable annuity has been developed
as a hedge against inflation. Under this type of contract the annuitant makes
periodic payments and receives an interest in a fund of common stocks and
bonds. The periodic benefits payable to the annuitant vary with the financial
success of the fund and of the insurance company's investment policy. The
Court was of two minds as to whether these new "insurance" and "annuity"
contracts were free of federal regulation by virtue of section 3 (a) (9) and of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act,2 54 which seeks to preserve to the states the
regulation of the insurance business.
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion denying exemption from
federal regulation. He believed the variable annuity contract lacked a basic
247. 1 Loss, SECURITIES RFGULATION 80 (2d ed. 1961).
248. Ibid.
249. UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 414(h); 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 247, at 89.
250. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
251. Paulos v. Best Securities Inc., 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961).
252. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
253. Companies "organized as an insurance company, whose primary and pre-
dominant business activity is the writing of insurance ... and which is subject to super-
vision by the insurance commissioner ... of a State" are exempt from the Investment
Company Act, §§ 3(c)'(3) and 2(a) (17), 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c) (3)
and 80a-2(a) (17) (1958).
254. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(b) (1958).
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feature inherent in all "insurance," that there be "some investment risk-taking
on the part of the company. '25 5 There must be "a guarantee that at least
some fraction of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts." 256 Thus, "there
is no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance as it has com-
monly been conceived of in popular understanding and usage." 257
In a concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan conceived the problem to be whether the variable annuitant needed the
protections envisaged by the regulatory controls embodied in the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 or whether the state
insurance regulation provided an adequate substitute. It was his view that
although variable annuities embody certain features of traditional annuities,
they essentially are so similar to contractual plan mutual funds that Congress
in providing the 3(a) (8) exemption could not have intended that they be
liberated from the federal regulatory scheme and left exclusively to state in-
surance regulation.25 8 Of the three opinions, Mr. Justice Brennan's contains
by far the most penetrating analysis of the interaction of the two regulatory
schemes, one devised for securities control, the other for the business of in-
surance. With all due deference, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion is not the
Justice at his best.
In Blau v. Lehman,259 the Court held Lehman Brothers, one of the great
Wall Street investment banking firms, not to be subject to the recapture
provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
profits sought to be recovered were those received on the purchase and sale
of securities of an issuer of which one of the Lehman partners was a director.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, believed the Court was precluded
from holding that the partnership was also a "director" and thus subject to
the Act on the basis of a finding by the two lower courts that the partnership
did not deputize the partner serving as director to represent the firm. Mr.
Justice Douglas wrote a strong dissent.260 It was inconceivable to him that
the absence of formal approval of the representation was significantly different
from informal approval of the relationship. "Everyone knows that the invest-
ment banking-corporation alliances are consciously constructed so as to increase
the profits of the bankers."'26 He concluded: "What we do today allows all
255. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
256. Ibid.
257. Id. at 73.
258. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, being joined by Justices Frank-
furter, Clark and Whittaker. Curiously enough, Mr. Justice Frankfurter was one of the
draftsmen of the Securities Act of 1933. His collaborator, Mr. James M. Landis, has
since written that Mr. Justice Harlan misread the history of the Securities Act of 1933
in several respects. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEo. WAsH. L. Rzv. 29, 46 n.24 (1959).
259. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
260. Chief Justice Warren concurred.
261. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 415 (1962) (dissenting opinion.). Cf. Wise, The
Bustling House of Lehman, Fortune, Dec. 1957, p. 157.
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but one partner to share in the feast which the one places on the partnership
table. They in turn can offer feasts to him in the 99 other companies of which
they are directors. '26 2 It remains to be seen how much comfort investment
banking firms can derive from the Lehman case, in view of the possibility that
other courts may not be equally charitable, and may be inclined to draw an in-
ference of representation on similar facts.
263
C. Corporations
Several of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinions have established new trends in
the main currents of corporation law.26 4 Another opinion by Douglas in the
antitrust field rests upon his application of state corporation law principles, 265
and at least one of his dissenting opinions also falls within this general cor-
porate field. 2 6 Comment, however, will be limited to the impact of his opinions
upon the evolving law of corporations.
Two companion cases involved the proper alignment of the corporation as
party to the action in a shareholder's derivative suit brought in a federal court
on the basis of diversity. It has long been established that for the purpose
of obtaining federal jurisdiction in diversity suits there must be complete
diversity between the plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants, on the
other.26 7 A corporation has traditionally been regarded as a citizen of the
state of incorporation, irrespective of the citizenship of its shareholders. 268
Furthermore, the corporation is an indispensable party to any derivative suit,
since any judgment for or against the corporation will be bindng upon it.269
The liberal venue270 and service of process 271 provisions of the Judicial
Code frequently enable a shareholder to prosecute a derivative suit in the
262. Blau v. Lehman, supra note 261, at 420 (dissenting opinion).
263. For an analysis of the problem and a suggestion for corrective legislation, see
Comment, Securities Regulation: Insider Status in Legal Fiction and Financial Fact-
A Proposed Revision to Section 16(b), 50 CALiF. L. Rxv. 500 (1962).
264. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944);
Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
265. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959) (dissolution of
Maryland and Delaware corporations under indictment for violation of the Sherman Act
does not abate the proceeding; under the applicable Maryland and' Delaware statutes,
their corporate lives continue so as to make them "existing" corporations within the
meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act). See also United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 636 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting), a case concerning interlocking director-
ates under § 15 of the Clayton Act.
266. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).
267. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
268. Louisville, C. & C. RE. v. Letson 43 U.S. (2 How.) 496 (1844). Since the 1958
amendments to the Judicial Code a corporation is also deemed to be a citizen of the state
where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
269. Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903).
270. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958).
271. Process in a stockholder's derivative action may be served upon the corporation
in any judicial district where it is organized or is licensed to do business or is doing
business. 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1958).
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federal courts which he could not effectively maintain in any state court.272
For the purpose of determining whether complete diversity exists, however,
the court will realign the parties according to their interests in the suit.273 The
shareholder's suit is an invention of equity which allows the shareholder-
plaintiff to maintain the action on behalf of the corporation, if, after demand,
the board of directors declines to bring the action.2 74 Under American practice
the shareholder-plaintiff names the corporation as a formal defendant, even
though it might be regarded as the actual plaintiff, 275 since the action is brought
for its benefit. In those cases where the corporation and the actual defendants
are citizens of the same state, the realignment of the corporation as plaintiff
would defeat diversity jurisdiction. More than fifty years ago, however, the
Supreme Court laid down the rule that while normally in a derivative suit the
corporation will be realigned as a plaintiff, if the corporation is under control
of a board of directors antagonistic to the shareholder-plaintiff's interests so
that he cannot get redresswithin the corporate structure, such realignment will
not be necessary. 276 The cases of Smith v. Sperling 277 and Swanson v. Traer 2
78
compelled a re-examination of the scope of this doctrine where the directors
refuse to sue but assert that they are not hostile or antagonistic to corporate
interests.
In Sinith v. Sperling, a shareholder-plaintiff from New York brought a
derivative action on behalf of X corporation of Delaware alleging a waste of
corporate assets for the benefit of Sperling, a son-in-law of a director of the
corporation, and Y, the son-in-law's corporation, also of Delaware. The X
corporation was named a defendant in the action. Plaintiff complained that
certain agreements between X corporation and Y corporation were unfair
to X. Demand on the directors of X corporation to institute the action was
not made, plaintiff alleging that demand would be futile, since a majority of
the board had approved the contracts. After a fifteen day hearing the district
court ruled that since there was no fraud on the part of the directors in mak-
ing the contracts, but only the exercise of their independent business judgment,
the management was not antagonistic to the financial interests of the corpora-
tion. Relying on Doctor v. Harrington,279 the court realigned X corporation
as a plaintiff and dismissed the bill for want of diversity. Similarly, in Swanson
v. Traer, the shareholder-plaintiff alleged fraud in the sale of corporate prop-
erties to another corporation in which some of the directors of the selling
272. See Dean v. Kellogg, 294 Mich. 200, 292 N.W. 704 (1940).
273. Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
274. The federal courts developed certain, equitable limitations upon a shareholder's
standing to sue. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). These rules were codified
in Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix (1881), and eventually found their way into FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b).
275. See Groel v. United Electric Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 Atl. 1061 (Ch. 1905).
276. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
277. 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
278. 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
279. 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
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corporation were personally interested and that, for this reason, demand on
the directors would be futile. Although it clearly appeared that the directors
were opposed to bringing the action, the Court of Appeals concluded that
there was no hostility so as to create the requisite "antagonism." Accordingly,
that court realigned the corporation as a plaintiff with the effect of defeating
diversity jurisdiction.
When the cases reached the Supreme Court each was reversed in 5-4 de-
cisions with Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the majority.280 He noted that
the gist of the findings of the district court was that there was no antagonism
between the management and the financial interest of the corporation because
a non-fraudulent independent business judgment had been exercised. This,
Douglas argued, was not a jurisdictional question. The charge is normally
cast in terms of some illegality and the answer always denies it. To settle
that conflict necessarily involves examination of the merits - a wasteful
expenditure of energy on a preliminary issue in the case.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Bur-
ton, Harlan and Whittaker concurred. To him the decisions overturned "a
half-century's precedents" of the Court. He would apparently align the corpo-
ration as a plaintiff unless at least a majority of the directors are implicated
or are under the dominance of the actual defendants; indeed, unless "the very
individuals who have a stranglehold over the corporation are the people
against whom the suit is sought to be brought .... ,,21 This view, he believed,
was compelled by Article III of the Constitution; that unless such antagonism
existed between the corporation and its management there was no "contro-
versy" between plaintiff-shareholder and the corporation which would require
that the corporation be aligned as defendant. With all due deference to the
learned Justice, this line of argument takes a wholly unrealistic view of the
nature of the corporate structure and the conflicting positions of a plaintiff-
shareholder and management in this type of derivative suit. Moreover, the
rule advocated by the dissenting Justices would render effective prosecution
of legitimate grievances in the state courts impracticable in many situations
because of constitutional barriers relating to venue and service of process.
Accordingly, there appears to be no compelling reason for favoring state courts
over federal courts in this situation.
Among the most controversial of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinions is that in
Anderson v. Abbott,28 2 raising the question whether the use of a bank-stock
holding company to hold bank shares insulated the shareholders of the holding
company from statutory double liability formerly imposed upon the holders
of bank stocks.28 3 Banco, the holding company, bad been organized in 1929
280. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957) ; Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
281. 354 U.S. at 104.
282. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
283. The Bank Act formerly provided:
The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held individually
responsible .. .for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to
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by the management of the National Bank of Kentucky and the Louisville
Trust Company to perfect an alliance between Bank and Trust Company. The
union was accomplished by having Banco acquire most of Bank and Trust
Company shares in exchange for its shares. Some of the shareholders par-
ticipating in the exchange purchased additional shares of Banco for cash.
Banco also sold additional stock to other individuals for cash; and most of
these funds were invested in Bank shares. In a little more than a year Bank
and Trust Company failed causing Banco to topple also. The Comptroller
of the Currency levied a double liability assessment against Banco as the holder
of substantially all of Bank's shares. Having obtained only partial satisfaction
from Banco, the Bank receiver sought to recover from each shareholder of
Banco his pro rata part of the balance of the assessment based upon his share-
holdings in Banco. The district court found that Banco had been formed in
good faith, was not a sham, had not been formed as a means of avoiding
double liability, and dismissed the bill. The Court of Appeals agreed and
affirmed.
In another 5-4 opinion, the Court, with Mr. Justice Douglas as spokesman,
reversed. In his view, the former shareholders of the Bank who exchanged
their shares for Banco shares retained through Banco their former investment
position in the Bank, including control, and did not constitute Banco as an
adequate financial substitute. To allow them to thus escape liability would
contravene the policy of the law underlying statutory double liability. The main
assets of the holding company were stocks in banks which carried a double
liability, and there were no free assets which would constitute an adequate
reserve against the double liability on the bank stocks. Moreover, he saw no
substantial distinction between the former shareholders of the Bank and those
individuals who purchased shares of Banco for cash. A purchases underlying
bank shares for $10,000 and exchanges those shares for shares of Banco; B
buys Banco shares for $10,000 and Banco invests these funds in shares of
an underlying bank.
From the practical point of view A and B are investors of the same class.
To say that A is liable and B not liable when both start with cash and end
with identical investments is to make the difference between liability
the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition
to the amount invested in such shares; . . . 12 U.S.C. § 63.
The stockholders of every national banking association shall be held individually
responsible for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, each to
the amount of his stock therein at the par value thereof in addition to the amount
invested in such stock. The stockholders in any national banking association who
shall have transferred their shares or registered the transfer thereof within sixty
days next before the date of the failure of such association to meet its obligations,
or with knowledge of such impending failure, shall be liable to the same extent as
if they had made no such transfer, to the extent that the subsequent transferee fails
to meet such liability; but this provision shall not be construed to affect in any way
any recourse which such shareholders might otherwise have against those in whose
names such shares are registered at the time of such failure. 12 U.S.C. § 64.
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and no liability turn on distinctions which have no apparent relevancy
to the legislative policy which the rule of double liability was designed
to protect. And to say that courts may hold A liable but not B is to
make the occasions for the assertion of judicial power turn on whimsical
circumstances.28 4
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a stinging dissent, in which Justices Roberts,
Reed and Frankfurter concurred. He conceded that there might be some basis
for holding the former shareholders of the Bank liable. In spite of the ex-
change of Bank shares, its stockholders, through the holding company, re-
tained a large measure of control over the Bank as well as the benefits of
investment in it. Accordingly, if examination of the evidence should warrant
it, the Court might reach the legal conclusion that double liability of the
shareholders of the Bank survived the exchange. This, however, would be
on the theory that the former shareholders were liable as stockholders of the
bank, whereas the Court was holding them subject to a different and smaller
liability as stockholders of the holding company. At the same time the Court
was concluding that the purchasers of the holding company stock for cash
had acquired a substitute double bank stock liability proportionate to their
investment in the holding company. Thus, in his view, the grounds for liability
of the Bank stockholders and the non-Bank stockholders were inconsistent.
"If the new stockholders for cash are liable it is hard to see why the old ones
have not found a substitute, and if the Bank ... stockholders have not found
a substitute, it is difficult to see a basis on which the new stockholders are
liable."'285 In any event, since the new stockholders never at any time owned
shares in a national bank it was impossible to understand how their action
defeated any federal policy concerning national banks. Congress had declared
no such policy; and the Court was engaging in judicial legislation.P 6 A survey
of newspaper sentiment evoked by the decision and the strongly worded dis-
sent was taken shortly after the case was handed down; it reflects a good deal
of turmoil over the role played by both majority and dissent in "legislative
matters."12 7 Although double bank stockholder liability has long since been
284. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 367 (1944).
285. Id. at 372 (dissenting opinion).
286. Id. at 379-83 (dissenting opinion).
287. The reactions of the daily press were greatly influenced by the language of the
minority. With the only discovered exception of St. Louis, Mo., Star-Times,
March 7, 1944, which took the view that "the majority clearly observed the bounds
of the law," newspapers seem to have taken the charge of usurpation of legislative
functions at its face value. They spoke of "government by decree" [San Diego,
Calif., Union, March 7, 1944], "justice by ear" [Wall Street Journal, March 8,
1944], "courts of ideology" [Washington, D. C., Post, March 10, 1944], and, of
course, "judicial legislation" [Washington, D. C., Star, March 7, 1944]. But while
using the arguments of the minority, the editorials did not spare it in their attacks.
They spoke of charges of "exclusive blackness between, pot and kettle" [Journal
of Commerce, March 8, 1944], noted that "certain members of the court have shown
uncertainty of conviction, by being first on, one side of the fence and then on the
other" [Colo. Springs, Colo., Gazette, March 13, 1944], found it "interesting to
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supplanted by a system of deposit insurance, Anderson v. Abbott still stands
for the proposition that a strong legislative policy may not be thwarted by the
use or misuse of the corporate form.288
There remains only to consider Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Pepper
v. Litton,28 9 written early in his judicial career when the Justice's interest
in and enthusiasm for the work of the Court was at its height. Of all his
opinions, this in all probability has had the greatest influence upon the law
of corporations. To me, it is a superb opinion, the Justice at his best. The
case basically raises a bankruptcy prbblem. It concerned one Litton who
sought to use a "one-man" corporation to defraud Pepper, a creditor of the
corporation. Pepper had brought suit against the debtor corporation in a
state court to recover royalties due under a lease. While the suit was pending,
Litton caused the corporation to confess a judgment in his favor in the
amount of $33,000 representing accumulated salary claims. Execution was
issued but Litton, apparently with the aid of the Sheriff, waited for the
outcome of the Pepper suit. When Pepper obtained a state court judgment
against the corporation for $9,000, Litton obtained time to take an appeal,
but executed on his judgment against the corporation and purchased corporate
property at the execution sale for $3,200. This property was then transferred
to another one-man corporation in exchange for its stock. The debtor corpo-
ration thereupon filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. It had assets of
$16,500 and Litton's remaining claim was for almost $30,000. Litton then
proceeded to buy up all remaining claims against the debtor corporation, ex-
cept the Pepper claim. In further state court litigation in which Pepper sought
to have the Litton judgment declared void, the state court held that at one
stage of these proceedings Pepper, and the trustee in bankruptcy, who was
representing Pepper as the only creditor, had treated the fund derived from
the execution sale under the Litton judgment as valid, and therefore were
estopped to attack it. When the question of the allowance of the Litton judg-
ment came before the bankruptcy court, however, the court found on the
facts that there had been a deliberate attempt to avoid the payment of a just
debt and disallowed the claim. On appeal, the Circuit Court reversed, holding
that the state court judgment was res judicata in the bankruptcy proceedings.
The Court, in an unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, reversed.
have a minority, particularly when that includes Justice Felix Frankfurter, accuse
the court of making laws" [Indianapolis, Ind., Star, March 8, 1944; Muncie, Ind.,
Star, March 9, 1944] and observed that the dissenters "apparently now place the
Constitution above the New Deal" [Salem, Ore., Journal, March 7, 1944]. Some
dailies saw in the instant case the result of "packing the Supreme Court with sup-
posedly New Deal political stooges" and an episode of the Executive's usurpation
of both legislative and judicial functions ...
Note, 44 CoLum. L. REv. 561, 565 n.30 (1944).
288. Cf. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C.C.
E.D. Wis. 1905). But see United States v. Elgin J., & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936);
United States v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 771 (1948).
289. 303 U.S. 295 (1939).
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The main thrust of the Douglas opinion is that a bankruptcy court is essen-
tially a court of equity; it is granted the power to allow or disallow claims;
and in the exercise of its equitable powers it may disallow or subordinate
claims "to the end that fraud will not prevail, that the substance will not
give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial
justice from being done.' 290 This equitable power exists to pass upon claims
of an officer, director and stockholder in bankruptcy proceedings against his
corporation. Then comes a statement of the fiduciary obligations of officers,
directors and controlling stockholders, that has become a classic quotation on
the duties of these persons not only to the corporation,291 as such, but to the
shareholders, and in the event of insolvency, to the creditors as well.
A director is a fiduciary ... So is a dominant or controlling stockholder
or group of stockholders. . . .Their powers are powers in trust. Their
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and
where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is
challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove
the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. The
essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the trans-
action carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not,
equity will set it aside. While normally that fiduciary obligation is en-
forceable directly by the corporation, or through a stockholder's derivative
action, it is, in the event of bankruptcy of the corporation, enforceable by
the trustee. For that standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the
protection of the entire community of interests in the corporation -
creditors as well as stockholders....
... He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and
his cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corporation
to their detriment and in disregard of the standards of common decency
and honesty. He cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate
the ancient precept against serving two masters. He cannot by the use
of the corporate device avail himself of privileges normally permitted
outsiders in a race of creditors. He cannot utilize his inside information
290. Id. at 305.
291. Jenks traces the importance of the development of equity reform in English
common law and concludes that in. England this process of adjusting the law to make it,
responsive to social needs came to an, abrupt termination in, the last quarter of the
eighteenth century. The second of his examples touches on the fiduciary relationship of
corporate managers to the shareholders:
The second example is that of the company promoter or director, who shields
himself from liability towards his real beneficiaries, the shareholders, behind the
artificial protection of that purely legal entity, the company. With a reasonable
application of equitable principles, the monstrous doctrine: that "the directors of
a company are not trustees for individual shareholders," would never have been
adopted; and directors who are secretly negotiating a profitable sale of their com-
pany's assets would not be allowed to go about buying up shares with a view to
profiting at the expense of their own shareholders. The Court which decided
Keecls v. Sand ford [(Ch. 1726) Sel. Cas. Ch. 61] would have made short work of
a claim such as that. (Footnotes omitted.]
JENxs, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLisH: LA W 240 (6th ed. 1949).
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and his strategic position for his own preferment. He cannot violate rules
of fair play by doing indirectly through the corporation what he could
not do directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and
to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute
in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the
equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement,
preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of
the cestuis. Where there is a violation of those principles, equity will
undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its consummation.
292
In a very real sense this passage epitomizes the Justice's basic philosophy
of corporate regulation. This conception of fiduciary obligation, the insistence
on the ancient precept that no man can serve two masters, is a theme that has
pervaded his thinking in this field as teacher, government servant and judge.
CONCLUSION
In 1925, when Douglas launched his teaching career, the regulation of
corporate enterprise depended primarily upon state statutes supplemented by
judicial controls based on equitable principles. The corporation statutes of the
more "liberal" states were then as they are today, essentially enabling acts
containing many loopholes for an irresponsible management and few provi-
sions for the protection of shareholders. Added to this was the freedom to
choose the state of incorporation, regardless of where the business is to be
conducted. Moreover, securities regulation was entirely dependent upon state
action. With the tremendous growth in the number and size of corporations
and the interstate nature of the economy, the old system of state regulation
was found to be completely inadequate to meet the economic and social crisis
precipitated by the great depression.
The emergence of the American system of corporate regulation since that
time parallels the growth and development of the man. Chairman William L.
Cary of the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently reminded us
that "the securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly new and
far-reaching body of Federal corporation law. '293 Douglas of the Securities
and Exchange Commission was one of the chief architects of that system.
And as a member of the highest court he has played a crucial role in the
development of judicial doctrines which for many purposes have created a
new federal law of relations between management and investors.
29 4
The poet has said: "Bring me men to match my mountains. '295 Douglas
was such a man. On this, the silver anniversary of his service on the Supreme
Court, the country can salute him: "Well done, thou good and faithful servant."
292. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-11 (1939).
293. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
294. Cf. McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961).
295. Sam Walter Foss, The Coining Amierican.
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